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In 1784, the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant announced, “Enlightenment is man’s 
emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s 
understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its 
cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack of resolve and courage to use it 
without guidance from another… Nothing is required for this enlightenment, however, 
except freedom; and the freedom in question is the least harmful of all, namely, the 
freedom to use reason publicly in all matters.”1 Over 130 years later, at the height World 
War I, a group of politicians and intellectuals associated with the German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) took up Kant’s idea of enlightenment in an attempt to promote 
democratization in Germany. In their minds, the freedom to use reason in public affairs 
would lead to the establishment of specific form of parliamentary social democracy, or 
Parlamentarismus.  
However, any history of democratization in Germany is problematic because 
German development in the first half of the twentieth century has shaped the way 
historians approach the history of the nineteenth century. The existence of Nazi Germany 
has subsequently shaped the study of German history, even for those who do not study 
Nazi Germany directly. Historians of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries find 
that they must address the Third Reich and the questions that its existence forces us to 
ask. To answer why the Third Reich occurred necessitates a series of questions revolving 
around German social, political, cultural, and intellectual development. Historians must 
ask, even if they do not want to, whether Germany was uniquely predisposed to the anti-
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democratic and illiberal ideology of National Socialism. Even for those historians who 
have identified democratic ideas and movements that existed in pre-World War I 
Germany do so with the knowledge that their work contributes in some way to the 
understanding of the Third Reich. 
In addition to the history of the nineteenth century, the history of the German 
Revolution of 1918, and whether it was really a revolution at all, compounds the 
problems of German democratization. On November 9, 1918, German sailors revolted, 
sparking an uprising that spread to the workers. The de facto military dictatorship that 
ruled Germany during the last half of the war handed control of the country over to the 
civilian, Social Democratic-led government. What the German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), which was already experiencing internal divisions arising from the conflicts over 
reform versus revolution and German war aims, achieved over the next months and years 
would be subject to intense scrutiny from contemporary observers and later historians 
alike. Did the rise and fall of the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 indicate a 
failure of the SPD more so than a failure of democracy in general? Were there 
alternatives to the ideas and institutions upon which Weimar Democracy was built? 
These questions are just some of the problems inherent in the study of German 
democracy.  
This thesis examines a group of German intellectuals and politicians who, during 
World War I, formulated and proposed a democratic ideology based on their 
interpretation of the German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant and integrated 
his ideas with those of Karl Marx, the father of modern socialism. Their theory was an 
attempt to legitimize democracy in Germany at a time in which democratic reforms came 
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to the forefront of German politics. These thinkers advocated a non-revolutionary 
foundation for social democracy by emphasizing the role of human reason and agency in 
the process of democratization. Because they had abandoned the need for revolution, 
which most early nineteenth-century socialists believed was socialism’s ‘final goal,’ 
these thinkers were known as revisionists. The revisionists’ primary medium through 
which they espoused their views of social democracy was the journal Sozialistische 
Monatshefte, which ran from 1893 until 1933. The timeframe on which this argument 
focuses is the last two years of World War I, when Germany’s failure achieve a victor’s 
peace opened new avenues for the center-left of the political spectrum to achieve 
democratic reform. But despite these opportunities, the possibility of achieving reform 
was under constant threat from the both the increasingly radicalized right and the 
revolutionary left. Nevertheless, the revisionists sought to carry forward the process of 
democratization, and by doing so, reconnected with the ideas of the Enlightenment. 
This reconciliation of Kant’s idealism and Marx’s materialism resulted in a form 
of parliamentary democracy based on Kantian reason and Marxian economic 
determinism. For the purposes of this thesis, the German term ‘Parlamentarismus’ refers 
to the democratic system proposed by the revisionists. Although the word literally means 
‘parliamentarianism,’ in the context of this argument, Parlamentarismus implies more 
than just a system of parliamentary government; it incorporates both structural and 
philosophical concepts relevant to revisionist ideology. By contrast, use of the English 
term ‘parliamentarianism’ refers to the general, and literal, concept of parliamentary 
government. While their philosophical methods largely corresponded to traditional 
notions of ‘German thought’ and placed a heavier emphasis on social, rather than 
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individual, justice, their overall project was similar to that of other European thinkers 
between the Enlightenment and the turn of the twentieth century, to the extent that they 
sought to find a philosophical foundation for representative government and mediate the 
conflicts between individual and social rights. Revisionism may have been a relatively 
small part of the German left, but the nature of revisionism allowed its proponents to be 
freer in their work because they were not as constrained by rigid adherence to party 
programs as their mainstream counterparts. Despite their small numbers, the revisionists 
are important because they allow us to understand more fully the role of ideas in the 
process of German democratization. 
While the revisionists’ goal was some form of socialism, democratization was the 
most urgent matter during the final two years of World War I. The revisionists had 
abandoned the Marxist assertion that the collapse of capitalism would lead to revolution 
and they instead advocated working within the existing framework of the state to achieve 
reform. As Peter Gay points out, a fundamental difference between Marx and the 
revisionists was Marx’s belief that the state had to be destroyed before socialism could be 
implemented.2 As Karl Kautsky, a preeminent Marxists ideologist who popularized 
Marxism during the early twentieth century, asserted in 1909, “Worried friends fear that 
the Social Democratic Party will prematurely gain control of the government through a 
revolution. However, if there is for us a premature attainment of power, it is the 
acquisition of an appearance of control of the government before the revolution, that is, 
before the proletariat has achieved real political power.”3 In contrast, the revisionists 
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 Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Bernstein’s Challenge to Marx (New York: Collier, 
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 Karl Kautsky, The Road to Power: Political Reflections on Growing into the Revolution (New Jersey: 
Humanities Press, 1996), 90. 
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sought to transform the state through a process of democratization, which would 
revolutionize the way the people thought about their relationship to the state, which in the 
context of German history was particularly problematic. A genuinely democratic 
government would overcome the division between the people and the state by making the 
government directly responsible to the majority parties of the Reichstag, and thus 
accountable to the people. 
 As late as 1918, the revisionists insisted that no philosophical foundation yet 
existed on which a functional modern democracy could be constructed and so they sought 
to provide that foundation by using the philosophical framework provided by Kant and 
Marx to reveal the means to democratizing Wilhelmine Germany. Although they 
abandoned Marx’s reliance on the dialectic, revisionists retained his economic 
determinism. In turn, they used Kant to show that economic determinism was both 
rational and efficacious. The revisionist politician Heinrich Peus explained the 
significance of the revisionists’ task by asserting, “The division within the people 
between those who represent the theories of government and those who govern in reality 
is very damaging; both belong most closely together, both must fertilize each other, both 
must know that both the abstracting, seeking theory, as in accordance with the law of 
being, and the struggling practice of the governing of world and life through the people, 
within the immediate given reality, are necessary.”4 
The bulk of the source material comes from journal articles published in the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte, a biweekly publication addressing a range of topics, between 
1917 and 1919. Although not an official party journal, and certainly less prominent than 
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 Heinrich Peus, “Demokratisches Wahlrecht, aber was weiter?” Sozialistische Monatshefte, no. 14 (July 
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Neue Zeit and Vorwärts, Sozialistische Monatshefte nevertheless offers insight into a 
particular component of German thought. The writers for this publication, some of whom 
served as members of the Reichstag during the Weimar Republic, collectively offer a 
clear position on how the German government ought to have functioned. Through their 
writings, it becomes clear that they neither toed the line of mainstream Marxism, nor 
advanced an alternative form of proletarian rule. Instead, they advocated a form of 
parliamentary democracy. They believed that Germany’s system of constitutionalist and 
authoritarian rule, its Obrigkeitssystem, had shown itself to be neither just nor functional.5 
The structure of this thesis reflects the structure of the revisionists’ theory. The 
first part of the argument focuses on the revisionists’ elucidation of their philosophical 
foundation. They believed socialism possessed both a philosophical root and an economic 
root, but because the economic root had taken priority over the philosophical, the 
revisionists insisted that it was necessary to further develop a social democratic 
philosophy. The purely materialistic approach of the economics contrasted with the 
tradition of German philosophical thought and therefore this part of the argument 
contains discussions of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, but it is primarily an examination of how 
the revisionists interpreted and applied the theories of Kant and Marx. The second part of 
the argument examines how the revisionists sought to alter the way the people thought 
about the relationship between themselves and the state by encouraging the 
democratization of all aspects of government and by insisting that legislative and 
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administrative bodies share the same democratic ideology as the people themselves. Their 
Parlamentarismus was the legitimate form of government for reasons that are directly 
linked to the revisionists’ philosophy and specifically focused on stages of political 
development, representative government, and the administration of the state. The political 
reformation that the revisionists sought was the reinstatement of philosophy into the 
political sphere. 
It is important to remember that the focus of this study is not on the actual 
institutions themselves. Rather, it is a study of how a specific group of intellectuals 
thought about democracy in general, and political institutions in particular. It is an 
examination of how revisionist Social Democrats thought about how these institutions 
related to the process of democratization, which itself was drawn from a process of 
working out certain philosophical problems. The purpose of this specific focus is to show 
that the revisionists, at this critical juncture in German history, felt compelled to 
formulate a genuine theory of democracy. Their reliance on other German philosophers, 
all of whom formulated their ideas under their own circumstances, illustrates a great deal 
about how German intellectuals worked. More importantly, it highlights how they 
attempted to create a new society from their philosophy and, perhaps, sheds light on why 







Chapter 1: Historical Context 
The intellectual history of the German revisionist Social Democrats is an important 
example of how German history contains both peculiarities and similarities to the 
development of other European states. The existence of such peculiarities does not imply 
a German Sonderweg, or special path. Nor do its similarities imply that Germany’s 
development was identical to that of other Western states. They merely serve to illustrate 
that German intellectuals could draw from their past to propose a uniquely German form 
of democracy, even in the face of a widely anti-democratic social and political system. 
The revisionists recognized the flaws of the Kaiserreich and even attributed them to some 
level of German peculiarity, but they also claimed to have recognized a set of universal 
laws that guided the development of Western democracy. They used these ideas to 
integrate those elements of the Imperial system that worked and to remedy those that did 
not.  
Emphasizing the role of socialist theorists in the process of German 
democratization also means that the bourgeoisie were not the sole agents of 
democratization in Germany. Marx had called the bourgeoisie’s role in historical 
development the “the most revolutionary part” for its overcoming the feudal system and, 
as a consequence to its contributions to economic developments, it developed liberalism, 
which strongly advocated ideas such as individual liberty and representative government, 
throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.6 However, because socialism 
generally rejected all aspects of bourgeois society, it remained almost exclusively in 
opposition to liberalism. Furthermore, few of Marx’s prognostications came true, and for 
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these reasons, socialists played a relatively small role in the process of democratization. 
This idea that a successful bourgeois revolution was a necessary for German 
democratization or that a well developed bourgeoisie was a precondition of the successful 
modernization of Germany’s social and political spheres ignores the role of the non-
revolutionary left. Revisionism, however, bridged bourgeois and socialism ideas. It did 
not reject bourgeois society to the degree of mainstream socialism and its democratic and 
reformist tendencies have had a significant impact on the rise left. 
The primary task of this thesis is to outline the revisionists’ theory of democracy, 
but it also places the revisionists within the larger context of German political 
development. The much-debated Sonderweg thesis argues that Germany’s development 
was fundamentally different from that of other European states. Historians advocating a 
German Sonderweg tend to focus on the ideas and structures that led Germany to the 
Third Reich. Opponents of this idea focus on Germany’s similarity to other states and the 
dangers of a normative approach. Although the argument that there is a direct line 
between the 1871 and 1933 is overstated, there were powerful anti-democratic elements 
in nineteenth-century Germany, including the otherwise liberal middle class. While the 
recent historiographical trends have downplayed the role of these anti-democratic 
elements, it is important to recognize their existence. There is another aspect of political 
development that has received less attention. In the larger history of socialism, the history 
of revisionist social democracy has mostly been told as a conflict between Marxists and 
revisionists. It is necessary to look at the theories proposed by the revisionists not simply 
for their contributions within the SPD, but for how they contributed to the 
democratization of Germany as a whole. 
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That there is some level of continuity between pre- and post- WWI ideas can 
hardly be disputed. The question is what that continuity was and how it was significant to 
the course of Germany history, with a particular focus on revisionism. My purpose is to 
neither affirm nor refute those arguments that place the origins of the Third Reich in the 
nineteenth century, but rather to explain the foundations and form of parliamentary 
democracy advocated in the pages of the Sozialistische Monatshefte in terms of its 
significance as a genuinely democratic political theory. Parlamentarismus was an 
ideologically distinct alternative to the choices between socialism and liberalism. 
 
The German Question 
This thesis explores the revisionist theory of democracy, so it is necessary to examine its 
place within the historiography of German political development, German social 
democracy, and European intellectual history during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The role of revisionism rarely appears in the larger context of 
German social and political development. With a few notable exceptions, even historians 
of social democracy limit revisionism to a phase in the history of socialism. Scholars who 
study revisionism, such as Peter Gay, Sheri Berman, and Manfred Steger, recognize that 
it was more than a phase of social democratic development and is important because it 
forced the left to abandon its singular focus on the economic conflict between the social 
classes and the resulting revolution, and to adapt to changing circumstances.7 For these 
reasons, it played a vital role in the success of establishing democracy after World War 
II, not only in Germany, but in other countries. The argument presented here, however, 
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focuses on the significance of revisionism before World War II. It examines how 
revisionism addressed a broad range of social, political, and philosophical issues and 
subsumed them under the broad institution of democracy. 
The collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Third Reich have 
dominated German historiography, both implicitly and explicitly, since 1945. The 
fundamental question is whether these events define German history. In other words, was 
the Third Reich the culmination of all German history prior to 1933 and, by extension, 
did 1945 mark a new beginning in German history? If the answer is affirmative, then the 
case for a German Sonderweg, which asserts that Germany developed differently than 
other Western European states and that this difference directly contributed to the Third 
Reich, seems logical. From this perspective, the focus is on Germany’s failure to 
complete the process of democratization successfully undergone by other Western 
European states. If, however, one argues that the Third Reich was not the culmination of 
all preceding history, but rather an interruption in the process of social and political 
development largely caused by short-term factors, then the focus is on showing that 
Germany did not depart from a normative path of development and that the anti-
democratic elements did not hinder democratization in Germany any more than they did 
elsewhere. By and large, current historiography rejects the Sonderweg, but the pro-
Sonderweg historiography that dominated the 1960s nevertheless asks very important 
questions about German history. 
Marcus Kreuzer ‘maps’ out three main positions within the historiographical 
debates over German exceptionalism, which greatly assists in conceptualizing the 
 12 
difficulties inherent in studying democratization and parliamentarization in Germany.8 
Kreuzer labels these groups “pessimists,” “skeptics,” and “optimists.” The optimists 
believe Germany successfully underwent a process of parliamentarization that resulted 
from a gradual process of political development not substantially different that much of 
the rest of Western Europe. Conversely, the pessimists argue that the political institutions 
in Germany were too rigid to accommodate change and extra-constitutional forces within 
Germany impeded parliamentarization. Lastly, the skeptics see evidence of both 
successes and failures in the process of parliamentarization, finding that the repressive 
and divisive elements of German society ultimately outweighed the successes of 
parliamentarization over the long term.9 
The pessimistic view contends that the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the 
rise of National Socialism resulted from an anti-liberal and anti-democratic tradition that 
developed among a broad spectrum of German society during the nineteenth century, 
beginning with the elites and spreading to the bourgeoisie. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
scholars such as Fritz Stern, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler argued that this 
tradition fostered authoritarianism and undermined democracy, and which ultimately 
culminated with the rise of National Socialism.10 These scholars point to the intellectual 
and cultural movements of Romanticism and Idealism, as well as the social and political 
impacts of the developing middle class, unification, and industrialization, which created 
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Stern, The Failure of Illiberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany (New York: Alfred 
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an introverted, apolitical, and obedient German populace. Additionally, the middle class, 
who theoretically should have been the source of liberalism, instead allied themselves 
with the conservatives, who, under Bismarck’s leadership, granted the middle class what 
it wanted most- a unified German state with the economic conditions favorable to 
modernization. By the eve of the First World War, Germany remained politically 
backwards, with a relatively weak middle class.11 
Dahrendorf exemplifies the pessimist approach by asking, “Why is it that so few 
in Germany embraced the principle of liberal democracy?”12 The answer to the so-called 
‘German Question’ focuses on the concept of “illiberalism,” a term coined by Fritz Stern 
and borrowed by Darhrendorf. The German philosopher G.W.F. Hegel was one of the 
most significant contributors to illiberalism, according to this view. Hegel’s idealism 
asserted that the legitimate form of the state was that which balanced reason and 
tradition, citing 1820s Prussia as an example of the actualization of the ideal.13 His 
philosophy was so influential that J.W. Burrow calls Hegel’s advocacy of constitutional 
monarchy in his Philosophy of Right one of the major foundations for both German 
nationalism and German conservatism in the decades leading up to the First World War.14 
In The German Conception of History, Georg Iggers emphasizes the extent to which the 
Hegelian concept of the state manifested in ways outside of politics proper, specifically 
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as it influenced nineteenth century historicism. Although historicists believed in neither 
Hegel’s dialectical method, nor his absolute idealism, they used his conception of the 
state as a justification for conservatism and authoritarianism, which illustrates how 
widespread this illiberal ideology was.15  
Other scholars show that, at its most extreme, illiberalism spread into the German 
cultural identity. For example, Fritz Stern and Wolf Lepenies have gone so far as to claim 
that parliamentarianism was inimical to German identity and that being apolitical was a 
virtue.16 Lepenies argues that German intellectuals viewed Kultur as a “noble substitute” 
for politics, in this case meaning parliamentary politics. Lepenies, like others, believes 
that the ‘German cultural elite’ put the state above the liberal politics of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and thus rejected parliamentarianism as being 
culturally foreign.17 
These various obstacles to German democratization warrant serious investigation; 
however, the approach outlined above risks overstating the degree to which the existence 
of these concepts actually blocked democratization in Germany. This historiography 
assumes that 1933 was a direct consequence of illiberalism and its focus on causality can 
be dangerously close to what Thomas Nipperdey calls “quasi-teleology,” in which 
scholars work backwards from a specific chosen endpoint and focus on a single line of 
historical continuity.18 Their singular focus on the power of illiberalism obscures any 
achievements made by the proponents of liberalism and democracy. The great question is 
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whether these processes actually failed and whether their failure actually constitutes 
enough of an impact to be a precondition of the Third Reich. 
Historians such as David Blackbourn, Geoff Eley, and Richard Evans, challenge 
the Sonderweg historiography.19 They believe that such works unjustifiably draw a direct 
line of continuity between German history as a whole and the atrocities of the Third 
Reich. As Blackbourn and Eley insist, the main problem with emphasizing Germany’s 
uniqueness is that it necessarily implies a normative approach to history. German history, 
they argue, must be studied on its own terms, not as a comparison to the British, French, 
or American history. Not only must the process of German democratization be studied on 
its own terms, but the concept of revolution and the role of the bourgeoisie must also be 
free from the normative approach. Finally, one of the problems with many approaches to 
German history is its emphasis on the liberal path. Dahrendorf’s German question 
exemplifies this emphasis on the bourgeoisie and liberalism, which is itself a limitation. 
Blackbourn and Eley’s work, while it critiques the normative approach, is also not 
entirely free from it. Many scholars, including Dahrendorf and Stern, argue that one of 
the factors contributing to the rise of illiberalism was the weakness of the German middle 
class.20 A common interpretation of the failure of 1848, the ‘revolution from above’ in 
1871, and rapid industrialization during the late nineteenth century was that these 
circumstances interfered with bourgeoisie’s political development. The result was a 
politically backward, yet economically modern state in which the bourgeoisie had 
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become attached to the anti-liberal, anti-democratic worldviews of the elites.21 However, 
as Blackbourn and Eley both stress, the bourgeoisie in nineteenth-century Germany was 
neither weak nor underdeveloped. According to Blackbourn, the German middle class 
was a strong, but “discreet,” force in many spheres of German society. Its successful 
“silent revolution” was the development of a bourgeois civil society that largely defined 
German society as a whole. Even though the middle class did have some form of 
revolution, Blackbourn still admits that the German bourgeoisie failed in the political 
sphere, as it opted to retreat from proper politics and instead remained a driving force in 
the market, in civil society, and in local affairs.22 According to the skeptical view, the 
bourgeois revolution was successful, assuming that the definition of ‘revolution’ is not 
confined to a political confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy, but as a 
larger process of economic progress and the social transformations that go along with it. 
Blackbourn and Eley suggest that it is more appropriate to speak of an 
“embourgeoisement of German society,” rather than a feudalization of the bourgeoisie.23 
The problem with Blackbourn’s approach is its emphasis on the necessity of the 
bourgeoisie in democratization. However, Sherri Berman argues that social democracy, 
not liberal democracy, triumphed after 1945.24 
The history of German social democracy is often self-contained, in that it focuses 
on the history of socialist theory and party programs and not as much on the role of social 
democracy in the process of democratization. Two classic studies of German social 
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democracy that focus on the rise of reformism between the fin de siècle and World War I 
are Carl Schorske’s German Social Democracy and Peter Gay’s The Dilemma of 
Democratic Socialism.25 Schorske follows the intra-party conflicts between the growing 
reformist tendencies and the increasingly radical faction on the extreme left. His primary 
goal is to show that these debates, which intensified after 1905, led to the party’s split in 
1917. Gay’s work, by contrast, is an intellectual history of Eduard Bernstein and focuses 
on Bernstein’s challenge to mainstream social democracy and his attempt to formulate a 
revised social democratic theory. Both focus on the role of ideas, but both are somewhat 
constrained by the narrow focus of the application of those ideas. The conflicts on which 
Schorske focuses relate to specific situations faced by the SPD, for example, how to 
respond to the Moroccan Crisis or to a specific election. Since the focus is on the split, 
the larger context of socialist thought is missing. Gay, on the other hand, focuses 
exclusively on Bernstein and one comes away with the assumption that Bernstein 
singularly defines the revisionist movement. 
Even the more recent historiography of revisionism focuses on the continuity 
between Bernstein’s ideas as laid out in his Preconditions of Socialism and the 
establishment of social democratic states after World War II.26 There are two problems 
with this approach. First, while Bernstein represents many of the ideas of revisionism, he 
was not its sole proponent. Many other Social Democrats contributed to the formation of 
the revisionist ideology and their contributions must not be overlooked. Secondly, to also 
claim that early twentieth-century revisionism was a precondition for the development of 
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post-WWII social democracy overlooks the historical context in which each form of 
social democracy was active. The break from mainstream Marxism was likely necessary 
for the development of post-WWII social democracy, as reflected in the Bad Godesberg 
Program, but the SPD of 1959 was looking to establish its relevance in light of the 
success of the more liberal Christian Democratic Union. The revisionism that existed up 
through the First World War was more explicitly tied to the ideas of the Enlightenment 
and sought to establish an a priori basis for democracy. Sherry Berman’s The Primacy of 
Politics shows that democracy and capitalism have long been at odds and that as far back 
as Marx, there had been a tradition within the socialist movement which insisted that 
democracy could bring about the end capitalism.27 Bernstein emphasized this argument 
the turn of the twentieth century and found himself castigated by mainstream Marxists. 
Berman focuses on the normal definition of politics, but she does not examine the 
meaning that politics held for the revisionists, which was a belief that reason and 
knowledge would push people to act rationally and therefore toward democracy. In short, 
politics was rational activity  
One final complication in the history of German democracy is contemporary 
Germans’ own perspective of the Sonderweg. When historians discuss the Sonderweg, 
they generally refer to a post-1945 concept; however, it actually existed, albeit with 
different implications, before 1945. If we ask to what extent illiberalism impeded 
democratization in Germany, then it is important to acknowledge how Germans 
perceived themselves during this period. Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
Germans not only acknowledged their differences from the other European powers, but 
they used them as a source of pride, which appears to lend credence to the post-1945 
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version of the Sonderweg. Mark Hewitson argues that Wilhelmine Germans 
acknowledged their state’s unique path during the decades leading up to WWI and 
attributes it to the increased role of national politics and the state, rather than the social 
influences emphasized by Blackbourn and Eley.28 Although he shares the emphasis on 
national politics with pro-Sonderweg historians like Hans Ulrich-Wehler and Frtiz 
Fischer, he does not accept their conclusions that the pseudo-democratic institutions of 
Wilhelmine Germany delayed the ‘normal’ path of development. Rather, Hewitson 
argues that many Germans accepted the Imperial political system largely because of the 
way its peculiarities mediated particular interests, which fits with claims that German 
thought in the early and mid-nineteenth century had a significant impact on the German 
identity at the beginning of the twentieth century. The revisionists also acknowledged 
Germany’s uniqueness, but unlike many others in Germany, they did not accept it.  
The purpose of this thesis is to explain revisionism’s role in the process of 
German democratization. While it acknowledges that illiberalism existed, it nevertheless 
illustrates that democratic theory was possible, despite its proponents drawing from the 
same German ideas that influenced illiberal thought. Additionally, rather than explain 
revisionism as the necessary transition from pre-World War II social democracy to post-
World War II democracy, this thesis insists that it is necessary to study this revisionism in 
the context of what it sought to achieve in its immediate circumstance. The continuity 
between the Kant, Marx, and revisionism illuminates more about the possibility of 
democratization at the end of World War I than it does about the nature of social 
democracy after World War II. 
                                                 
     
28
 Mark Hewitson, “The Kaiserreich in Question: Constitutional Crisis in Germany before the First 
World War,” Journal of Modern History 73, no. 4 (2001): 725-80. 
 20 
WWI and Democratization 
World War I presented both opportunities and problems for the process of German 
democratization. Throughout the war, there was not only a struggle between those who 
recognized the need for reform and those who sought to maintain the status quo, but there 
was also tension within the reformist camp, which was torn between supporting the war, 
effectively forcing them to side with their ideological opponents, and opposing the war 
while working toward domestic reforms that would eliminate their opponents’ social and 
political status. At the outbreak of the war, ‘the spirit of 1914’ had a powerful unifying 
effect and reflected a widespread belief that Germany’s ‘encirclement’ by hostile foreign 
powers justified the war along patriotic grounds. More importantly, this belief had even 
spread among the Social Democrats. As a result, German Social Democrats were torn 
between a patriotic position of supporting the German war effort and renouncing a war 
that their ideology had initially labeled a consequence of capitalist society. This awkward 
position manifested as a series of struggles within the SPD, between the left and the right, 
and between the Reichstag and the military leadership. 
Although revisionism existed well before the outbreak of WWI, the effects of the 
war put immense strain on the German political system and, by 1917, these strains 
provided the revisionists an appropriate context to elaborate their ideas. By this time, 
there had been no significant breakthrough in the fighting, despite the previous two years 
having witnessed the costliest, most destructive battles of the war without the advantage 
shifting in any side’s favor. However, several events in 1917 fundamentally shifted the 
dynamic of the war. In March, Imperial Russia collapsed and the Tsar abdicated. The 
Provisional Government that took its place was a coalition of liberals and democratic 
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socialists, but it remained committed to the war effort and continued disaffection with the 
war led to October Revolution, in which the radical Bolsheviks assumed power and 
quickly moved to end Russian participation in the war. The ostensible success of a 
socialist revolution in Russian initially appeared heartening to the socialists in Germany, 
including those who supported the war, while the withdrawal of Russia from the fighting 
appeared as an even greater success to the German war effort, which the confused state of 
German socialism. Finally, the United States’ entry into the war in April 1917, prompted 
in part to Germany’s resuming of unrestricted submarine warfare, posed a serious threat 
to the German war effort and Germany itself. With the failed German offensive in the 
spring and summer of 1918 and the success of the American military, the United States 
government increased the pressure for the complete democratization of Germany. 
While the opportunity to push through democratic reforms opened by 1917, 
internal obstacles stood in the way of reform. The de facto military dictatorship of Erich 
von Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg as the third Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), had 
assumed control of the German government in 1916. As heroes of the early battles on the 
Eastern front, their insistence on achieving a ‘victor’s peace’ conflicted with the left’s 
hopes to reach a ‘negotiated peace’ and clear the way for reform. The weakness of the 
civilian leadership strengthened OHL, as the Kaiser deferred to OHL, Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg lacked the means to effectively lead any coalition of political parties, 
and the Reichstag only possessed the power to approve funding for the war. Ultimately, 
no part of the civilian government was able to find any traction with which to initiate and 
sustain the reform movement. In addition to the weakness of the civilian government, the 
conservatives solidly backed OHL, not only because they supported a victor’s peace, but 
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also because a victor’s peace would bolster the conservative alliance and thereby 
maintain its political and social standing.29 As long as OHL and its conservative 
supporters remained in control, the left would find it difficult to overturn the Prussian 
three-tiered voting system and the barring of Reichstag ministers from serving in the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat), as well as removing the obstacles to entering the civil 
service.  
Among the conservatives who so solidly backed OHL was a group of 
annexationists, most notably the Pan-German League that not only sought a victor’s 
peace, but also to expand German territory. These groups undertook a successful 
propaganda campaign that made the idea of a negotiated peace untenable. In the face of 
these conservative cabals, the majority of Social Democrats found themselves in an 
awkward position in which they generally supported, or at least tolerated, the 
government’s war effort, but opposed annexation. While they wanted a negotiated peace, 
any calls to end the war ran headlong into the opposition from OHL and its conservative 
supporters. The civilian leadership, represented by Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, was 
unable to counter the military leadership and its allies within the annexationist cabal. This 
represented weakness on the chancellor’s part, and strengthened both the annexationists 
and the opponents of reform.30 
Even within the Social Democratic camp, there was tension over the support of 
the war and the desire for reform. At the outbreak of war in July 1914, the SPD’s initial 
reluctance to support a capitalist war gave way to unanimous support from the SPD’s 
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members in the Reichstag. This political unity across party lines and social strata, the so-
called Burgfrieden, reflected the widespread belief that Germany was under attack from 
hostile nations. Although the unanimous support of the SPD only lasted until December 
1914, the majority its members continued their support of the war. However, as the war 
dragged on, the rift begun in December 1914 widened. By 1917, the number of Social 
Democrats who opposed the war and the intensity of their opposition reached such a 
degree that the party split. On one side were the Majority Social Democrats (MSPD); on 
the other, were the Independent Social Democrats (USPD). The USPD was not 
comprised of the most radical Social Democrats, but simply those who opposed the war. 
As far as the revisionists were concerned, the general tone of the Sozialistische 
Monatshefte reflected their continued support of the war, although Eduard Bernstein 
joined the USPD, along with some of his fiercest critics Rosa Luxemburg and Karl 
Liebknecht, as well as moderate Social Democrat Karl Kautsky. Within the larger context 
of democratization, this split reflected the difficulty inherent in the revisionists’ continued 
support for the war along patriotic lines, while simultaneously calling for major reforms. 
As the war dragged on, the strains it caused not only split the Social Democrats, 
but exacerbated class divisions and ultimately led to the end of the Burgfrieden.31 Food 
shortages and poor working conditions rekindled discontent among the working class, 
leading to an increase in the number of strikes and protests by 1917 and neither the SPD 
nor the trade unions were able to allay the workers’ frustrations. The strikes and general 
discontent put pressure on the SPD to achieve some level of reform. Following a major 
strike in the spring of 1917, Bethmann Hollweg announced to the Reichstag that 
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democratic reforms were necessary, particularly voting reform in Prussia and attempts to 
close the gap between the legislative capacity of the Reichstag and the executive capacity 
of the Bundesrat. However, because Bethman Hollweg lacked support from any of the 
major political factions, his attempt to initiate reform failed. In July 1917, a coalition of 
the SPD, the Center Party, the Progressives and the National Liberals formed the 
Interfraktioneller Ausschuss, or Inter-party Committee, to discuss ending the war through 
a negotiated peace. Again, however, a meaningful outcome failed to materialize in the 
face of opposition from the OHL and their conservative supporters. Perhaps the most 
significant achievement of the Interfraktioneller Ausschuss was the forced resignation of 
Bethmann-Hollweg. Bethmann Hollweg’s replacement, the more conservative Michaelis, 
accepted the peace resolution ‘as he understood it,’ which effectively killed the peace 
movement and the reform movement.32 
The events of 1917-1918 directly affected the authors writing for the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte. While their articles were not necessarily addressing new 
ideas, the impact of the war heightened the need for democratization. The domestic 
problems that came to a head in 1917 led to a greater emphasis on the 
parliamentarization. With the failure to achieve reform in 1917, the articles from 1918 
and early 1919 reflect the revisionists’ return to the philosophical foundations of social 
democracy in an attempt to more clearly explicate their ideology in the face the defeat of 
their domestic agenda. 
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Chapter 2: The Philosophical Foundation 
Friedrich Engels wrote in The End of Classical German Philosophy, “The great basic 
question of all philosophy, especially of more recent philosophy, is that concerning the 
relation of thinking and being.”33 Attempts at answering this question dominated 
philosophy during the Enlightenment and continued on through the works of Marx and 
the revisionists. This relationship between thinking and being, and more specifically, 
between thinking and action, provided the foundation on which the revisionists 
constructed their theory of social democracy. They reminded their fellow socialists that 
Marx was a philosopher and that his works must be understood as the product of his 
philosophy. Bernstein attempted to break the grip of the “scientific socialism” through a 
return to Kant. Bernstein’s Kantianism was largely an application of Kantian critique to 
socialism and did not use other elements of Kant as a basis for socialism.34 Within the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte, the revisionists combined Kant’s epistemology and 
transcendental idealism with Marx’s historical materialism to give socialist philosophy a 
more substantial foundation that could be put to practical use in the social and political 
spheres. The revisionists’ use of philosophy is important because it was the key to their 
understanding of the world and therefore was the key to democratization. Their particular 
philosophy explained the world in a way that gave social democracy both a rational and 
an empirical basis that was universal in its exposition of the world and its ethics. 
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Revisionist social democracy, because it claimed to be based on universal truth, 
abandoned the concept of class struggle and replaced it with the desire for cooperation 
and a faith in the human capacity for reason. Ultimately, the result of the revisionists’ 
merging of Kant and Marx was reinstatement of human agency in social democratic 
ideology. 
 
Bernstein’s Critique of Socialism 
Eduard Bernstein was the first a prominent Marxist to openly critique mainstream 
Marxism, when he famously declared that the socialist movement, not than the ‘final goal 
of socialism’ was of the utmost importance. To its critics, this revisionism amounted to 
little more than an attempt by a “petty-bourgeois democratic progressive” to convince the 
SPD to abandon all for which it stood.35 The so-called Revisionist Debate that began in 
1898 was the most substantive and open critique of Marxism by another socialist to date. 
Although Bernstein’s ideas differed from many the revisionists who wrote for the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte during World War I, his challenge to the SPD was a major 
turning point in the development of social democracy in Germany. He sought to eliminate 
the notion of scientific socialism by replacing science with Kant’s notion of critique and 
use this critical socialism as the underlying principle of social democracy. This implied 
that it was the duty of Social Democrats to critique the dogmatic assumptions of scientific 
socialism and thereby reinforce the ethical foundation found to be lacking in the static 
nature of contemporary Marxism. For much of his life, Bernstein remained a dedicated 
adherent of mainstream Marxism, but as Peter Gay explains, his “skeptical and empiricist 
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sympathies” forced him to challenge mainstream Marxism.36 By abandoning Marx’s 
dialectical method, and replacing it with what Peter Gay calls a “unilinear concept of 
progress,” Bernstein made a significant departure from Marxism.37 
Revisionists believed that focusing too much on the strictly economic aspect of 
socialism weakened social democracy because the circumstances facing Germany during 
the first two decades of the twentieth century did not correspond to Marx’s 
prognostications. Nor did it allow socialist theorists to respond to these changes in any 
meaningful way. It was not enough for them to emphasize the philosophical root; they 
had to roll back the underlying assumption about the economic root, which revolved 
around the belief that socialism was a science. This belief in scientific socialism was 
problematic for two reasons. If Marxist socialism was a science, then it was difficult to 
challenge the conclusions that Marxists drew. Second, any discussion of ‘science’ 
required a common definition, not only among people at a particular time, but also a 
common understanding of science over time.  
Between Kant’s time and the outbreak of WWI, the understanding of ‘science’ 
had undergone a number of revisions. Kant understood science as a set of rational 
categories that explain the relationship between objects of the natural world and the way 
we understand them. For Hegel, science was metaphysics because it was the only way to 
uncover the absolute truth that lay behind all aspects of existence. Marx’s materialist 
conception of history asserted that the foundation of social relations was based on 
economic factors that could be ‘scientifically’ verified, as the majority of Marxists 
insisted. By the twentieth century, science referred to an empirical inquiry of the natural 
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world. Although Bernstein rejected the notion of scientific socialism, he was influenced 
more by his contemporary understanding of science than by what Kant or Marx 
understood as science and his critique of Marxism was shaped by that concept.38 
 Scholars of Bernstein attribute his revision of Marxism to his lack of formal 
training in philosophy and his confused definitions of science.39 By the mid-nineteenth 
century, Europe’s intellectual current had shifted toward a scientific worldview based on 
empiricism and positivism and an altogether different kind of materialism than what 
Marx had advocated.40 While Bernstein relied on Kant’s more metaphysical 
interpretation of ‘science’ as “systematically ordered knowledge,” he combined Kant’s 
definition with the more empirical definition that fit the scientific standards of the late 
nineteenth century.41 While Bernstein maintained that he never resorted to “gross 
empiricism” but always to understand the relations of physical and mental phenomena,42 
his recognition that events failed to correspond with Marx’s predictions was largely 
driven by such empiricism. By the 1890s, Bernstein recognized that actual circumstances 
no longer corresponded to what Marx had predicted and he began to question the validity 
of mainstream Marxism. German workers were experiencing a more favorable situation 
than when Marx and Engels made their most significant theoretical contributions. Social 
Democracy and trade unionism continued to gain popularity, despite the growing 
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prosperity of the working class.43 Despite the apparent fact that society was moving away 
from an impending revolution, Bernstein did not claim that Marx was incorrect or 
mistaken, but instead questioned the interpretation of Marx advocated by so many social 
democrats. By focusing on the assumption that socialism was a science, Bernstein 
insisted that Marx and Engels never intended for their theory to be a closed doctrine, but 
always open to critique. 44 
The process of challenging scientific socialism therefore involved a series of 
claims, both implicit and explicit, that reinforced the role of philosophy in German social 
democracy in the twentieth century and helped bring about a more effective and 
democratic socialism than what traditional Marxism allowed. Refuting the belief that 
socialism was a science removed revisionism’s greatest obstacle: it made socialism 
capable of adapting to change, specifically allowing socialists to fully embrace 
parliamentarianism and use the existing framework of the state to work toward the 
greater goal of social justice. Bernstein addressed what he believed were the inherently 
problematic assumptions behind scientific socialism. “To view socialism as a pure 
science means to indulge in metaphysical speculation instead of dealing with reality. In 
the same vein, will must be curtailed by science…As soon as we subjugate science to our 
will, we petrify the dynamism of critique into static dogmatism.”45 Socialism required a 
foundation on which to base its policies, but had to be able to adapt to changing 
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circumstances and Bernstein insisted that his critique of scientific socialism provided the 
middle ground. 
In The Preconditions of Socialism, which outlined his overall critique of social 
democracy, and in a series of articles published in the Sozialistische Monatshefte from 
1900-1901, Bernstein explained the relationship between science and socialism, but more 
importantly, he pointed out the limits of scientific socialism. Science, as defined by 
Bernstein, is “experience building upon established knowledge” and socialists generally 
held two of Marx’s discoveries to be scientific: the materialist conception of history and 
surplus value.46 Bernstein used the latter to make his point. Discovering surplus value, 
however enlightening, did not make socialism a science. The discovery itself had little 
bearing on the course of social development; it only elucidated a fundamental aspect of 
the capitalist society. While Marx and Engel explained that the existence of surplus value 
was “the herald of a dawning socialist society,” Bernstein found where Engels later 
claimed that it was not surplus value that heralded the new socialist society, but the 
increasing awareness that the mechanism of surplus value was exploitative. Therefore, 
the existence of surplus value alone was not sufficient proof that the capitalist order 
would collapse.47 
Bernstein acknowledged that socialism strove toward goals “in accordance with 
knowledge capable of objective proof; that is, knowledge which refers to, and conforms 
with, nothing but empirical experience and logic,” but was careful to differentiate 
between being a science and being scientific.48 He explained that science contains both 
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pure theory and applied theory.49 Pure theory is universally valid because it comprises the 
sum total of relevant data, whereas applied theory is subject to change as knowledge 
increases. Rather than claim that Marxism was an applied science and therefore had to 
adapt as knowledge increased, Bernstein still maintained that the foundation of Marxism 
remained in the realm of pure science.50 However, pure science was not a closed doctrine. 
The laws of nature that provide the foundation of a pure science can not be fundamentally 
altered, but the manner in which they are understood can change. In an attempt to clarify 
his position, Bernstein compared Marxism as a pure science to agricultural chemistry or 
electrical technology, the basic laws of which remained constant, but allowed for a 
myriad of possibilities as knowledge increased, all of which could be incorporated 
without fundamentally altering those laws.51 
As one would expect, shortly after the publication of “How is Scientific Socialism 
Possible?,” Bernstein found himself forced to defend his definition of science. An 
anonymous reviewer offered an alternative definition of science, which was “the 
methodological generation of lawlike [sic] regularities in nature and society, classified in 
homogenous systems.”52 Scientific socialism, then, was the “uniform regularity of the 
social will” built upon the “necessary and inevitable conditions of human 
development.”53 Finally, the reviewer challenged Bernstein’s rejection of scientific 
socialism on the basis that it arises from volition. Bernstein countered these objections by 
claming that one cannot logically strive for what already exists. Once astronomers have 
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predicted an eclipse of the sun, he explained, one cannot will it because it is already 
shown to be certain. However, one can will the end of “exploitation, oppression, and 
poverty” because they are neither certain nor inevitable.54 It becomes clearer to see that 
Bernstein directed his critique toward mainstream socialism’s tendency to take Marx’s 
predictions for granted, without any consideration as to whether they precluded rational 
action or misrepresented the actual social will. 
It might appear that Bernstein was claiming that socialism was not a science in a 
strict sense, while simultaneously claiming that it was a pure science. However, his 
explanation of pure science reveals his fundamental point and where he takes up Kant. 
Pure science relies on the critique of the existing knowledge. Not only does Bernstein 
base his definition of science, at least in part, on Kant’s definition of science, but he also 
used Kant’s method of critique as the basis for justifying the scientific methodology of 
socialism. Bernstein asked, “Is scientific socialism possible and how?”55 Regarding the 
first part of the question, he answered that it was not. In response to the second part, 
Bernstein wrote, “Critique is the premise of scientific knowledge.” 56 Therefore, the term 
he believed most accurately described socialism was ‘critical socialism.’ Bernstein never 
intended to portray socialism as altogether lacking the methods of science, but he 
cautioned that “a theory or doctrine is often labeled as scientific because its structure 
reflects the formal requirements of scientific deduction,” but was not necessarily a 
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science. 57 He still believed that socialism, more than any other political movement, relied 
on a scientific approach to determine the proper course of action. 
In short, Bernstein believed that socialism was not a science, but that “of all social 
and political groupings, socialism is closest to science, because… it is freer in its critique 
of the existing social reality than any other party or movement. After all, critique is the 
premise of scientific knowledge. Society is a living, ever-evolving organism, and that 
party or class which has most to gain from progress is naturally more interested in the 
expansion of knowledge than any others.”58 This illustrates how Bernstein combined 
Kant’s view of science as how we see the world with the more modern view of science of 
how the world actually is. However, Bernstein’s revisionism fell short of offering clear 
direction. It effectively countered the dogmatism of scientific socialism, but it still lacked 
a firm answer to the question of how to effectively translate critique into political action.  
Bernstein insisted that socialism was not a science because it was predicated on a future 
event; that is, the collapse of capitalism and the subsequent rise of the classless society.59 
Socialism was thus an “image, a blueprint and theory of a certain social order” as well as 
a “movement toward a certain social order.” Both, he asserted, contained an idealistic 
element, “either the ideal itself or the movement toward such an ideal.” Socialism was 
something that should be striven for. When Bernstein asserted, “That which is usually 
termed the final goal of socialism is nothing to me, the movement everything,”60 he was 
accused of abandoning the ultimate premise of Marxism. The most important element of 
Bernstein’s argument was that it placed the emphasis on the everyday activities of 
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socialists. Socialist activity was not a means to the end, but rather were ends in 
themselves.61 
 
Marx and the Primacy of Philosophy 
Nineteen eighteen was a momentous year for many reasons, all of which intensified the 
revisionists’ calls for parliamentarization. Russian participation in the war ended with its 
signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and Germany launched a major offensive in the 
western front in an attempt to end the war. When this offensive failed, the war finally 
ended and Germany collapsed into revolution. By comparison, the centennial of Marx’s 
birth in May of that year might seem insignificant. However, to the revisionists, it was 
important and the Sozialistische Monatshefte dedicated the entire May 1 issue to 
discussions of Marx. The articles in this one issue provide a unique insight into the 
revisionists’ perception of Marx and his role in their social democratic movement. 
However, they also show how the revisionists reacted to German left’s failure to achieve 
reform in 1917 and consequently returned to the philosophical foundations of social 
democracy. With Germany’s chances for a victor’s peace dimming, the revisionists used 
the commemoration of Marx as an opportunity to formulate their social democratic 
philosophy. These articles make it clear that rather than using Marx’s work as the sole 
basis for socialism, revisionists used his work as one of two philosophical components of 
socialism. In fact, revisionists frequently used Marx as a point of departure from 
Marxism, which, despite the name, they believed was not consistent with Marx’s 
intentions. The commemoration of Marx in 1918 provided the opportunity for revisionists 
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to lay out their ideas, both to chip away at mainstream socialism’s monopoly on Marx’s 
ideas and to offer a more holistic socialist philosophy. 
Through these articles, the revisionists emphasized Marx’s role as a philosopher, 
which illustrates that philosophy revealed the basis, not only of the social democratic 
movement, but “of everything human.”62 For the revisionists, Marx’s significance was 
not limited to his the social and economic discoveries, but to the fact that philosophy was 
the means by which Marx employed to made his discoveries and, more importantly, 
philosophy revealed the means to effecting change. As the revisionist Alfred Moeglich 
wrote, “The creators of social democracy, Marx and Lassalle, proceeded from philosophy 
and by their exploration for truth later hit upon the economic driving force as the basic 
element of all social comprehension of the world.”63 Therefore, to understand the 
foundations of revisionist ideology, it is necessary to examine the significance of this idea 
of ‘Marx as philosopher’ and, more importantly, Marx as the “ethical driving force” of 
revisionist social democracy.64 
Marx asserted in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, “The philosophers have 
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point however is to change it.”65 Although 
explicitly mentioned only a few times in the May 1 issue of the Sozialistische 
Monatshefte, this “monumental final thesis on Feuerbach,” is perhaps Marx’s most 
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significant statement for understanding the revisionists’ interpretation of his philosophy.66 
In this one sentence, Marx criticized other philosophers for not taking their work beyond 
mere explanation of the world and asserted what he believed was the role of philosophy. 
Marx believed that people could not solve problems merely by explaining the nature of 
being. He believed people should solve problems through a process of removing 
philosophical contradictions. According to the revisionist Hugo Lindemann’s, Marx 
“shows [the proletariat] not an economic, but an ethical goal.”67 Philosophy was not only 
socialism’s source for acquiring the knowledge necessary to effect political change; it 
was also an ethical foundation. For Marx, understanding the nature of being allowed the 
proletariat to alter its consciousness and made it revolutionary. The outcome of such 
awareness would ultimately lead to the rebuilding of a society free from the 
contradictions that had made the previous historical epoch untenable. This thesis on 
Feuerbach illustrates Marx’s belief that philosophy was a necessary component to any 
political movement. 
Based on the revisionists’ critiques, the predominant form of Marxism as codified 
in the Erfurt Program of 1890 was not a political movement that could directly effect 
substantial change. In fact, a prominent criticism of the Marxists was that they sat idly by 
and waited for the inevitable revolution to occur.68 As Karl Kautsky, one of the SPD’s 
main Marxist theorists, explained in 1909, “The Social Democratic Party is a 
revolutionary party, but not a party that makes revolutions.”69 While Kautsky was a 
relatively moderate Marxist, on the extreme left of the SPD, ideologists like Rosa 
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Luxemburg cast reform and revolution as antithetical, arguing that any attempts at reform 
within the present historical epoch only served to distract from the final goal of 
socialism.70 The extent to which the SPD attempted to maintain its ostensibly doctrinaire 
Marxism culminated with the Dresden Resolution in 1909, which limited, or barred 
according to at least one revisionist, cooperation with other parliamentary parties by 
insisting that any attempt to achieve reform within the existing framework necessarily 
conflicted with the revolutionary foundation of socialism.71 According to the revisionists, 
there needed to be a re-examination of socialist philosophy, more specifically, of Marx’s 
role as a philosopher, which could provide a foundation that would more effectively 
guide a socialist movement. The explanations of Marx’s philosophy given in the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte were as much a critique of mainstream socialism as they were 
arguments regarding Marx’s true intentions. These carefully crafted interpretations of 
Marx were intended to provide a starting point on which a political movement could be 
built.  
It is important to remember that the revisionists cast their ideas not as a departure 
from Marx’s thought, but as a return to what they believed more accurately represented 
Marx’s intentions.72 They recognized the failure of Marx’s predictions to come true, but 
insisted that this did not discredit the use of philosophy to effect change. The SPD had 
failed to effect substantial change and as the revisionist Wally Zepler asserted, its 
weakness was due to “a philosophical degeneration” that contradicted Marx’s 
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“intellectual-ethical core.”73 Revitalizing socialist philosophy was vital to the success of 
social democracy. Restoring philosophy to its rightful place in the socialist movement 
and correcting misapplications of Marx’s ideas was a revival of an existing ideology. As 
Zepler asserted, “The party came to this dead end because, despite the sheer endless 
appeal to Marx, in the final analysis it has not kept alive his spirit, it has not understood 
that his noblest legacy lay in his ethos, in the connecting of ingenious thought with the 
highest power of ethical willing.”74 
The perceived disconnect between Marx’s philosophy and the explanation of the 
political economy offered by the SPD led Moeglich to describe true Marxism as being 
nourished by two roots- one economic and one philosophical.75 Marxists, however, left 
the philosophical root to wither by ignoring it and instead overemphasized the economic 
root, which made Marxist socialism appear scientific. Although this idea of scientific 
socialism set Marxism apart from the earlier utopian socialism of Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier, and others, it also crippled the socialist movement by forcing it to abide by a 
rigid economic foundation that no longer matched reality. The fundamental problem, 
according to the revisionists, was mainstream Marxism’s “unilaterally mistaking 
[Marxism] as an economic problem,” which conflicted ethically-driven politics that 
mandated socially justice government.76 Revisionists saw this not a merely as matter of 
misinterpretation, but rather as the omission of half of Marx’s theory. Claiming to be 
taking his lead from Engels’ “bitter complaints” on the subject, Moeglich linked 
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revisionist social democracy to Marx’s and Engel’s decades-old claims that everything 
had been done to nourish the economic root at the expense of the philosophical root.77 
The philosophical root is difficult to define with the same precision as the 
economic because it is not reflected by any quantifiable concept, e.g. surplus value. As 
Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach indicates, the philosophical root, because it is 
separate from the economic root, should not only serve to explain the world, but it should 
also direct human activity toward ends that are not reduced to the economic, but in 
accordance with reason. Although Marx had proclaimed philosophy to be the ‘intellectual 
weapon’ of the proletariat, Moeglich lamented, “The philosophical element was repressed 
in the practice of nascent socialism and so it has remained to the present day.”78 Given 
that economics was the determining factor only ‘in the last instance,’ as Marx and Engels 
frequently asserted, revisionist made a concerted effort to address other aspects of human 
existence. Therefore, their philosophical root contained elements of epistemology and 
deontology.79 It addressed the tension between idealism and materialism, and it 
encouraged the critique of the status quo. While each of these ideas will be addressed in 
more detail in the following paragraphs, the immediate point is that the revisionists’ used 
the concept of ‘Marx as philosopher’ to separate themselves from mainstream socialism. 
Using this critique as a starting point for a reappraisal of socialist philosophy allowed 
revisionism to overcome the SPD’s opposition to democratic reform within the existing 
framework of the sate and created an opening in which social democracy could develop 
without the need for revolution, which the circumstances by mid-1918 made all the more 
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pressing. The belief in this ‘withered root of socialism’ is important because it represents 
the revisionists’ emphasis that socialism was not merely a description of the world or a 
description of social relations along purely economic lines, but that there existed a 
separate and equally necessary philosophical component that could direct democratic 
activity along ethical lines. 
It was essential for the revisionists to revitalize the philosophical root by 
expanding on what little philosophy of socialism already existed. Their emphasis on the 
philosophical root of Marxism allowed them to reconfigure socialism to fit the 
circumstances in which they lived, while simultaneously drawing on existing ideas and 
institutions. Specifically, they used philosophy as the justification for their departure 
from the dominant theoretical foundation of Marxism, which had provided a very limited 
justification for parliamentary government and limited cooperation with the other 
political parties. Mainstream Marxism could never be a political movement because its 
adherents chose to remain focused on pointing out the inadequacies of the political 
economy and had no basis on which to actively address those problems. 
By emphasizing Marx’s own use of philosophy, these revisionists sought to 
transform what they believed had become merely an explanation of social and economic 
development into a viable political movement that expanded beyond the political 
economy, even if it retained some level of economic determinism. Rather than focus 
solely on economic matters to determine the party’s position on political matters, the 
contributors to the Sozialistische Monatshefte sought to expand the understanding of 
socialism by elucidating both the epistemological basis of socialism and by incorporating 
a deontological element. Revisionism preserved Marx’s status as the cornerstone of 
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socialism because he had uncovered the foundations of human development and because 
they believed Marx was an ethical figure around which they could build a movement. 
They also left open the possibility of incorporating other philosophical perspectives and 
the formulating of new ones. “The philosophical foundation of socialism is not yet 
complete; it is barely begun and forms the great task of the future,” wrote Moeglich.80 
As Bernstein pointed out two decades earlier, many of Marx’s prognostications 
failed to materialize. This was due, at least in part, to perceived flaws in Marx’s 
dialectical methodology. The revisionists wanted to abandon the dialectical method and 
expose what they insisted was Marx’s original intent. In the end, these revisionists 
transformed social democracy into a non-revolutionary, democratic movement in which 
Marx was still a significant figure, but they changed the dialectical materialism that 
guided nineteenth century Marxist socialism into a linear reform movement. The 
inexorable march toward revolution became an ethical call for progress. To differentiate 
science from the ideal, to show that political activity was an end in itself required 
knowledge of the goal and Bernstein claims to have meant, “The movement is everything 
to me because it bears the goal within itself.”81 The question, then, was how to 
understand the full significance of the knowledge that socialism provided. A more 
methodical examination of Immanuel Kant provides the answer because revisionism 
represented the merging of Kantianism and Marxism. According to revisionists, both 
philosophies were necessary to achieve a social democratic state. Kant allowed Marx’s 
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historical materialism to be rooted in the actual world without taking away human 
agency. 
 
The Reconciliation of Kant and Marx 
Like the vast majority of early twentieth century socialists, the revisionists believed that 
Marx was socialism’s central figure because his economic determinism revealed the 
fundamental truth governing social relations. The revisionists writing for the 
Sozialistische Monatshefte at the end of World War I recognized a flaw in what they 
perceived as a one-dimensional Marxism. While historical materialism revealed the 
nature of social relations as being based on economic determinism, without further 
explication, it only served to explain social relations as a system of cause and effect in 
which individuals merely respond to economic stimuli. It negated the impact of reason on 
historical change by failing to explain how the existence of a certain set of laws that 
guide and determine reality can generate knowledge that can then be put to practical use 
to alter the economic reality. To correct the socialist philosophy, the revisionists used 
Kant’s transcendental idealism to better explain Marx’s historical materialism. Only by 
using both sets of ideas could the revisionists propose a social democratic philosophy that 
explained the relationship of the mind and of being while also providing a deontological 
backing. Whereas Bernstein had focused on the belief that scientific socialism was a 
static ideology because Marxists viewed it as a closed socio-political doctrine, these 
revisionists believed that socialism had stagnated because it focused solely on explaining 
the nature of social relations and ignored the purpose of philosophy, which was to 
provide a justification for practical action. 
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Heinrich Peus distilled the revisionist project in the following manner, “If we 
want to say what Karl Marx achieved in the final essence, what it is that we may correctly 
call Marxism, it is not only the idea of the economic interpretation of history, but rather 
its practical application to economic and political critique and the action that springs from 
it.”82 Although appearing to be a straightforward interpretation of Marx’s eleventh thesis 
on Feuerbach, Peus sought to direct his readers’ attention to fact that Marxism failed to 
generate action from knowledge. By 1917, and continuing through 1918, the revisionists 
realized that establishing a democratic government in Germany was becoming 
increasingly possible due to the strains the war had placed on the existing economic and 
social system. However, with the opportunity for reform that had presented itself as early 
as 1917, there also came an increased threat from the right. While many on the left 
pushed for reform, the right insisted that a victor’s peace was still possible and this 
tension between victory and peace even found its way into the SPD, which split in 1917 
over the issues of war aims. To help social democracy take advantage of the situation, the 
revisionists knew it was necessary to overcome the perception that any ideology based on 
Marx’s historical materialism rendered the individual a “mere marionette of the law of 
causality.”83 Revisionists affirmed that economic determinism constituted the basis of 
social democracy, but they emphasized that social democracy was impossible to install 
without first understanding the nature of the underlying social reality. Determinism was a 
problematic concept because it appeared to strip away freedom and reason. According to 
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Kant, causality and freedom exist in opposition with one another.84 If revisionists 
explained human activity as being purely causal, that is, if economic existence causes an 
individual to act in certain manner, then humans were neither free nor rational. To 
reconcile the opposition between determinism and freedom, revisionism relied on Kant’s 
differentiation between the laws that determine the natural world and those that govern 
reason. The merging of Kantianism and Marxism shaped revisionist social democracy 
into a movement that acted in accordance with the actual world and was therefore a 
universal and ethical movement. 
As Bernstein had explained, socialism was both a means to an end and an end in 
itself. It was a critique of the existing social reality, a movement toward a new social 
reality, and the new social reality. Critique was Bernstein’s solution to the difficulty of 
reconciling the relationship between thinking and being. In his discussion of the 
limitations of scientific socialism, Bernstein had pointed out a relationship between 
interest and cognition. “Socialism as science depends on cognition, socialism as 
movement is guided by interest as its noble motivation.” 85 Cognition generates interest, 
Bernstein explained, but it does not generate action directly. Revisionists built on this 
interpretation of Kant to link knowledge and reason, and to show that rational action was 
made possible by cognition, but was not caused by cognition. Those who believed that 
the individual is a ‘marionette of the laws of causality,’ failed to distinguish between the 
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laws determining the empirical world and those that guided the use of reason.86 However, 
revisionist socialism was still based on the economic determinism inherent in the 
materialist conception of history, which forced the revisionists to elucidate the 
relationship between reason and material existence more clearly than what Marx’s 
assertion that social existence determines consciousness had done. The revisionists used 
Kantian epistemology to show that historical materialism, although deterministic, was the 
true means of understanding the world and they used Kantian deontology to direct 
socialist activity along those lines. 
Marx had contributed to the development of philosophy by returning to the study 
of the actual world because he believed his predecessors had inverted the relationship 
between actual things and their mental counterparts. Although Marx owed much to 
Hegel’s philosophy, Hegel’s insistence that reality was but a manifestation of a degree of 
the Absolute Idea was also Marx’s main target. As the philosophically-minded revisionist 
Otto Koester explained, Marx believed that Hegel had placed a greater emphasis on the 
idea than on the actual thing and therefore ‘turned Hegel right-side up’ when he asserted 
that consciousness does not determine being, but that social being determines 
consciousness.87 However, Marx also claimed, “The materialist doctrine that men are 
products of circumstance and upbringing… forgets that it is men who change 
circumstances.”88 On the one hand, Marx indicated that being determines action; on the 
other, he clearly believed that action could alter being. There was no inconsistency to 
                                                 
     
86
 Koester, “Zur Philosophie des Sozialismus,” 599. In addition to the previously cited explanation from 
Critique of Pure Reason, see also Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be 
Able to Come Forward as Science, trans. with introduction by James W. Ellington, 2nd ed. (First published 
1793; Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001). 
     
87
 Koester, “Zur Philosophie,” 598-599. 
     
88
 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker, 2nd ed. 
(New York: WW Norton & Company, 1978) 145. 
 46 
Marx’s position, but rather symbiosis between the human mind and the actual world. 
Marx believed people must use practical activity to reconcile society’s philosophical 
contradictions. While the economic position was deterministic ‘only in the final 
instance,’ as Marx and Engels qualified, the human mind is still capable of altering 
economic existence. 
The problem with Marx, according to the revisionists, was that socialist 
intellectuals had turned him into a “socialist dogmatist” whose ideas “preclude human 
will.”89 The materialist conception of history explained the nature of human relations as 
being based on material factors, specifically the individual’s relationship to the means of 
production, and that that material existence determined the individual’s consciousness. 
However, by misrepresenting the role of Marx’s economic determinism, Marxists had 
stripped socialism of its efficacious foundation and turned it into a fatalistic ideology, 
rather than providing the foundation for action that could reconcile philosophical 
contradictions. As Peus explained, revisionism insisted that such a misinterpretation of 
historical materialism turned Marxism into a mere explanation of events that occur 
without human intervention.90 When socialists attempted to introduce human agency into 
historical materialism, it appeared contradictory. The ‘obstetric view’ of Marxism, which 
explained the role of the proletariat as being an ‘obstetrician’ who would use the 
knowledge of social development to ease the birthing pangs of the new society, failed to 
adequately address how action was possible through knowledge. Koester realized and 
anticipated the question, “How can the individual, itself a cell forming in the embryonic 
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future state, at the same time perform the service of helping give birth?”91 Revisionists 
claimed to have found the solution to these problems by using Kant’s philosophy to 
explain how practical activity arises from economic determinism, which reaffirmed the 
individual’s role as an agent of historical change. 
Understanding Kant’s epistemology is crucial for understanding the revisionist 
worldview. Kant believed that the human mind did not passively accept the world around 
it, but that it contains an a priori framework of categories that allows it to understand the 
world in a particular way. He believed knowledge related to objects in two ways, “either 
as merely determining it and its concept, or as also making it actual. The former is 
theoretical, the latter practical knowledge of reason.”92 In The Critique of Pure Reason, 
first published in 1781, and its companion piece, The Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysic, Kant addressed the long-standing tension between rationalism and 
empiricism. Specifically, he focused on the role of causality, which he believed was a 
fundamental means by which we understand the world. Unlike the skeptical empiricist 
David Hume, who argued that causality was merely the ordering of empirical events, 
Kant asked how we could claim to speak of cause and effect without already possessing 
some basic knowledge of existence, time, space, and, most importantly, of causality 
itself. He asserted, “Without sensibility no object would be given us, without 
understanding no object would be thought.”93 Through his mediating of the conflict 
between pure rationalism and pure empiricism, Kant insisted that we focus not on 
discovering the nature of things, but rather on the nature of knowledge and the critique of 
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that knowledge. Bernstein focused on this critique of knowledge as a fundamental 
element of social democracy, but he did not address Kant’s ethics. 
In The Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explored 
practical reason, which is the foundation for human action. He realized that if causality, 
as it pertains to the empirical world, was applied to reason, it precluded freedom, which is 
the same problem that socialists faced a century later. Kant determined that there exist 
two different modes of thought, which are independent of one another and subject to two 
different sets of laws. One governs the sensible world and the other governs the 
intelligible world, and it is only through the latter that reason becomes practical. “The 
will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and 
freedom would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently on 
foreign causes determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the causality 
of all irrational beings has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign 
causes.”94 Freedom is therefore the use of reason. 
All rational beings must view themselves from these two separate, but not 
mutually exclusive perspectives. Like any object, the individual exists as an appearance 
in the empirical world and is subject to natural laws of that world. In the context of 
historical materialism, this means the individual is as much a part of materialism as the 
means of production and subject to the same determinism. However, each individual’s 
mind is capable of generating thought that is governed solely by reason. Despite their 
independence from the laws of the natural world, the laws of reason “require a judgment 
sharpened by experience in order to… distinguish in what cases they are applicable… 
and… to procure for them access to the will of man, and effectual influence on 
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conduct.”95 This final point illustrates the connection between the two perspectives, 
which the revisionists used reconcile the tension between determinism and rational, 
practical action. 
Peus further elaborated on the relationship between knowledge of the world and 
the capacity to act according to that knowledge, vis-à-vis Kant and Marx, 
The chemist as is generally known can produce wonderful benefits; but in 
doing so, he applies the relationship known to him by natural laws to 
chemical matters. He does not prescribe nature, but rather follows it in 
order to control it. Marx tells humankind: It should not seek what 
speculatively may be thought of as logical, but rather what is discerned on 
the basis of (particularly economic) actuality as possible thought and 
possible action of the will. Marx strove to free humanity’s thinking from 
mere fantasy, to subordinate it to reality and thus to make practically 
effective. With its doctrine of the dependence of thought on being, 
Marxism does not abrogate the action of the will, but rather makes it 
effective, possible, free.96 
 
Kantianism not only allowed socialists to recognize the nature of social existence, it also 
allowed them to act rationally. To rational beings, the application of reason is as much a 
part of nature as the world itself, and people are subject to both.97 There is no a priori 
knowledge of social development, but there exists the ability to acquire and understand 
that knowledge and put it to use. Historical materialism, as an explanation of social 
development, is independent from the ability to use reason to determine action, but still 
requires experience and knowledge of the world. Following Kant’s logic, Koester 
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insisted, “Wherever we explain natural phenomena…, we do it under the perspective of 
the law of causality. Wherever we consciously and systematically act…we no longer 
consider the world under the perspective of cause and effect, but rather from ends and 
means.”98  
Marx’s historical materialism showed that economic activity was the essence of 
human nature. However, the causality associated with Marxist determinism was only one 
mode of thought. Using reason to determine one’s course of action is not determined by 
the same causality that determines the natural world. Man is free to act according to ends 
and means, and thus arguing that “social development is not a fate for the people, but 
rather its work.”99 This illustrates how Kant and Marx together formed the nexus of 
revisionist social democracy. It is no exaggeration to claim that, for the revisionists, Kant 
had as profound an influence on socialism as Marx did. To revisionists, transcendental 
idealism complimented Marx’s materialism. Kant’s philosophy explicated the reciprocity 
between the mind and the world and it is that how we come to possess knowledge 
through the interaction of the two. “Marxism makes the human will active in the true 
sense… It says: Study the world of man, comprehend its relationships to natural law, 
understand its thought and willing from the actuality of the economic life… and then 
influence humanity in accordance with this knowledge.”100 
In Kant’s idealism, theoretical knowledge is limited to objects of perception and 
is governed by causality. Humans are part of the natural, empirical world, but also a part 
of the transcendental world of ideas. Practical reason asserts that morality transcends the 
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empirical laws of theoretical knowledge and is instead governed by reason and freedom. 
The humanist element of Marx illustrates that the essence of Being is determined by 
human relations, which themselves are determined by economic existence. The two 
perspectives both focus on the role that humans play. Thus to the revisionists, idealism 
and materialism complimented each other. According to Koester, “Kant’s idea of a 
General History with Cosmopolitan Intent had the same prime cause as Marx’s economic 
view of history. And Marx’s postulate on the individual to work for the developing 
socialism is carried by the same basic outlook borne as the Kantian ethic. Therefore, 
Social Democracy has the right to refer to Kant as well as Marx: more, however, the duty 
to re-develop the vestigial philosophy of socialism and thus develop an intellectual basis 
and an ethical push for that realization.”101  
Marxist determinism of was no longer a stagnating force. Instead, it focused the 
revisionists’ commitment to their social democratic reforms. By having a firmer 
understanding of social and political activity, as shaped by both reason and material 
factors, the uniqueness of the revisionists’ democratic ideology becomes clear. Moving 
from these philosophical foundations to the more specific discussions of the democratic 
state illustrates how the revisionists’ linked their discussions of knowledge and ethics to a 
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Chapter 3: The Blueprint for Parlamentarismus 
Koester summarized the connection between the knowledge derived gained from 
recognizing the actuality of economic determinism and the ethical action it generates 
when he asserted, “Equipped with such knowledge of the tendency active in the current 
society, we are now presented with the choice: with the proletariat for socialism or 
against the proletariat for capitalism, thus there can be no doubt which direction the 
categorical imperative points our will.”102 To work ‘with the proletariat for socialism’ 
meant striving for democracy. Because they believed that democracy was the means to 
achieving socialism, the revisionists abandoned the mainstream socialists’ opposition 
toward the state and chose instead to work within the existing framework of the state to 
achieve a democratic republic based on reason and duty. The revisionist conceptions of 
parliamentary democracy and republicanism were not, however, the same 
Vernunftrepublikanismus of Friedrich Meinecke and other later proponents of the 
Weimar Republic. Parlamentarismus was predicated on building from an existing 
democratic foundation based on a German philosophical tradition rather than a 
begrudging ex post fact acceptance of democracy that many Weimar Liberals labeled as 
rational republicanism.103 Understanding Parlamentarismus requires an understanding of 
how the revisionists thought about democracy, the nature of government, and state 
administration. Any notion of ‘revolution’ would only occur in the way the people 
thought about their relationship between themselves and their state.104 
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 In terms of the history of German democratization, the full significance of the 
revisionists’ attempt to advocate a specific form of Parlamentarismus can best be 
understood in the context of World War I. The war highlighted what revisionists 
recognized as the inherent flaws of Wilhelmine Germany, and in so doing illustrated the 
necessity of pushing for Parlamentarismus. At the same time, the war also provided the 
opportunity to shape their ideas into a more concrete form. The revisionists’ call for 
democratization in the form Parlamentarismus was a direct response to the necessity and 
opportunity the war created. The ideas presented in the Sozialistische Monatshefte 
between 1917 and 1919 were not entirely new, but they took on a new sense of urgency. 
Without the pressure of the war, the revisionists’ call would have had far less traction. 
 
Conceptualizing Democracy 
The revisionists’ Parlamentarismus was not just a proposal for a political system; it was a 
relationship of ideas, of philosophical and practical elements, that addressed the 
relationship of the people and the state. Rather than discussing a specific system of 
government, it is necessary to think of Parlamentarismus as the revisionists’ way of 
conceptualizing a specific political system in order to legitimize democracy against 
alternatives from across the political spectrum. At its core, parliamentarianism focused on 
the proper relationship between the people and the state. When viewed from the 
revisionists’ standpoint, their philosophical method revealed it the only legitimately 
democratic form of government. Since 1871, Germany had had a parliament whose 
members were elected through universal male suffrage. However, neither the existence of 
a parliament nor the fact that all men could vote made Germany a democracy, in the eyes 
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of the revisionists. Germany, as the revisionist economist Hermann Kranold asserted, was 
a Scheindemokratie, an institution bearing the form of democracy, but not the content.105 
The appearance of a democratic parliament belied its genuinely undemocratic 
functioning, as Bismarck intended.106 This is what the revisionists sought to remedy, to a 
limited extent through a restructuring of the government, but largely through a 
reorientation of how the people thought about their relationship to the government. 
The revisionist journalist and politician Ludwig Quessel, who wrote several 
articles on parliamentarianism, highlighted the problem associated with constitutionalism 
when he stated, “It ranks among the peculiarities of our intellectual existence that there 
were people in Germany who, from the backwardness of our political civilization… 
anticipated a strengthening of Germany in the world. They babbled of a specific German 
freedom and did not realize that behind this slogan, they hid general human bondage.”107 
While he directed this accusation at no specific individuals, those who accepted the 
common Hegelian conception of the state as the pinnacle of German freedom were the 
likely targets.108 His remarks also cast these ideas as the German manifestation of 
constitutionalism in general, rather than an entirely unique aspect of the German cultural 
and national identity. Like Hegel’s view of constitutional monarchy, Quessel defined 
parliamentarianism by its ideal place at the apex of political development. On July 18, 
1917, the day before the non-binding Reichstag Peace Resolution passed, he outlined 
three stages of this development, which he claimed “have directed the European people in 
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strict constancy from autocracy, beyond constitutionalism, to parliamentarianism.”109 In 
the first stage, which he admitted had all but disappeared from Europe by 1914, all 
political power rested with the monarch, who dictated the law to his or her government. 
At the time of Quessel’s writing, most European states were in the next stage of 
development, in which a constitution dispersed the monarch’s power through a 
representative body, a judiciary, and administrative officials. Despite being represented 
by parliament, the people still “exert no direct influence on government affairs.”110 
Quessel acknowledged that the people experience an “incipient freedom” under 
constitutionalism, even if the mechanism of constitutionalism failed to generate actual 
freedom.111 With the people still removed from power, a state of constant tension exists 
under constitutional government, as the bureaucracy and the parliament vie for power. As 
a likely legacy of the bureaucratic mentality arising from the Prussian reform era in the 
early nineteenth century, Quessel recognized that the administration was more directly 
involved in the affairs of state, and therefore defined constitutionalism as the “absolute 
rule of the bureaucracy within framework of the law.”112 Germany was still stuck in the 
Hegelian conception of the state at the beginning of World War I, but as the war 
progressed, it became increasingly apparent that Germany needed reform. 
According to Quessel, constitutionalism reinforced the gulf between the people 
and the state, resulting in tensions that rendered its continued existence unsustainable. His 
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claim that constitutionalism was inherently weak reflects the revisionist belief in the 
inevitable failure of bourgeois liberalism, but not necessarily because of its relationship 
to economic matters. Parliamentarianism was a necessary outcome because of the conflict 
between the parliament and the bureaucracy under constitutionalism. Progressing from 
the constitutionalism to the parliamentarianism would require few changes in the 
structure of government and would instead require a willingness to recast the relationship 
between the people and the government. Regarding ‘the people’ as a singular entity, 
parliamentarianism reacquires the monistic character of absolutism by making the 
government responsible to the people. In the words of another revisionist, the process of 
parliamentarization would be “the substitution of one government power, namely the 
bureaucracy, by another, namely the people.”113 As Quessel and others illustrate, the 
revisionists thought about parliamentarianism as a linear process that did not correspond 
to Marx’s dialectical development. Nor did they focus predominantly on the relationship 
between those who controlled the means of production and the workers. Indeed, there 
was no caveat explaining that economic forces determined the political affairs, although 
as the philosophical foundations of revisionism indicate, the revisionists still believed in 
some level of economic determinism. Unlike Marx’s dialectical history, Quessel’s stages 
of development are more similar to what Peter Gay calls a “unilinear concept of 
progress.”114 Change should occur in stages, but it was of neither dialectical nor 
revolutionary nature. 
As part of the conflict within the constitutional system, overcoming the special 
interests, which revisionists insisted were an inherent feature of constitutionalism, is 
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another part of the process of democratization and parliamentarization as part of a 
process. Taken together, Quessel’s discussions of democracy as a step in a larger process 
of altering the relationship between the state and the people with critiques of 
contemporary democracy indicates that constitutionalism, bourgeois democracy, and 
liberalism were essentially the same in the mind of the revisionists. In March 1917, 
during the initial calls for reform, Heinrich Peus cited a recent speech by the conservative 
Count Yorck von Wartenburg, in which von Wartenburg criticized the Western 
parliamentary tradition for its being dominated by financial institutions, religious 
interests, and the private dealings of ministers conspiring to govern against the will of the 
people. Peus agreed with von Wartenburg’s assessment, but drew a different conclusion. 
Rather than using examples of corruption to discredit democracy in general and to justify 
conservative rule, Peus argued that von Wartenburg described only bourgeois 
democracy.115 The revisionist jurist Wolfgang Heine also defined parliamentarianism in 
contrast to bourgeois constitutionalism. According to Heine, the government, being 
comprised of special interests, retains power while the parliament acts merely as the 
“supernumerary, the choir, which is appointed to murmur approvingly.”116 Part of the 
transition from constitutionalism to parliamentarianism is the people’s recognition of the 
general interest and their determination to actualize it. The political parties, as 
representatives of the people, ought not to agree with the government out of convention, 
because then the parties are not acting freely. Rather, they must form coalitions based on 
a mutual recognition of the general interest.117  
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As a system of government, the revisionists offered several definitions of 
parliamentarianism, each with a slightly different emphasis, but united in their call for a 
re-conceptualizing of the relationship between government institutions and the people. 
According to Hugo Lindemann, many mainstream social democrats who opposed 
parliamentarianism simply defined it as a system of government in which the majority 
party selects the ministry.118 Lindemann remarked that this definition ignores the 
formation of coalition governments, which precluded both England and France, two of 
Europe’s established parliamentary systems. The formation of coalition ministries was a 
prerequisite for democratic parliamentarianism because all people needed to feel 
responsible for the state.119 The question for the revisionists to answer was ‘Why must 
Germany move toward Parlamentarismus and the sense of responsibility that it entailed?’ 
 
Necessity and Possibility 
Revisionists conceived of parliamentarianism as existing at the intersection of necessity 
and possibility. Necessity possessed two meanings, one practical and the other 
theoretical. Practical necessity reflected the precarious situation in which Germany found 
itself by 1917, while philosophical necessity referred back to the stages of development. 
From a practical standpoint, parliamentarianism was necessary for Germany’s survival, 
or, at the very least, for its survival as a great power. Revisionists blamed the World War 
on the inherent flaws of the constitutionalist stage of development, in which private 
interests dominated political affairs. Internal and external pressures created a series of 
crises in Germany by 1917, which only escalated over the next year. The war created 
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food shortages, strikes, calls peace by inter-party coalitions, and promises of reform from 
the Kaiser. By the end of 1917, as little had been accomplished domestically as had been 
accomplished militarily; however, it was clear that the Burgfrieden was unraveling. 
Between Woodrow Wilson’s initial declaration of his Fourteen Points in January 1918 
and his notes to the German government in October of that year demanding full 
parliamentarization, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Germany’s best chance 
to retain any semblance of it pre-war status was to democratize and that required 
fundamental changes to the country’s political and social system. In the context of 
revisionist theory, however, the practical necessity of parliamentarianism makes more 
sense when viewed in conjunction with its philosophical counterpart. The idea that the 
nature of reality revealed both the necessary functioning of the actual world and, through 
a proper understanding of the actual world, created the possibly for change. The 
philosophical element therefore reveals how revisionists thought about their 
circumstances and the role of reason in political development. Only within the context of 
necessity and possibility did the revisionists believe democratization possible. As the 
articles in the Sozialistische Monatshefte indicate, 1917 was significant for the 
development of Parlamentarismus. 
The war appeared to prove Quessel’s point that parliamentarization was necessary 
for Germany’s continued development and increasingly possible by 1917. Not only did 
these revisionists blame the constitutionalist system for involving Germany in a 
devastating World War, but they also believed that that system had been unable to meet 
the financial demands of the war to the same degree as its parliamentary opponents, 
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namely France and Great Britain.120 Quessel pointed out that German intellectuals had 
“finally acquired the insight that our Obrigkeitssystem is no match for the 
parliamentarianism of the enemy powers and its removal is a national necessity.”121 
Quessel elaborated by citing the French and British military experiences, not just in 
World War I, but from the time that each had implemented parliamentarianism, as 
evidence of the parliamentary system’s superiority over constitutionalism. He praised the 
parliamentary cooperation used to meet the demands of modern warfare, crediting 
parliamentarianism for England’s history of military success against the numerically 
superior French and for France’s reconstruction after its defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
War in 1870.122 However, it was Germany’s confrontation with England in 1914 that 
provided the most obvious evidence that parliamentarization was necessary. As Quessel 
explained, the British managed to raise and supply a new fighting force, despite the 
virtual annihilation of the British Expeditionary Force in 1914. At the same time, the 
British managed to raise additional tax revenues, while Germany’s tax revenues had 
declined, and the British provided benefits to veterans, widows, and orphans.123 Because 
parliamentary government relied on genuine representation and cooperation, only it was 
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capable of meeting the tremendous demands of modern society. Hugo Poetzsch 
concurred, asserting, “The World War yielded… the recognition that the parliamentary 
system of government must be striven for as a pressing necessity for the continued 
development of Germany.”124 Responding to his own hypothetical question regarding the 
most important domestic task facing the Social Democrats in 1917, Lindemann answered, 
“The formation of our constitution for parliamentary government. On this one 
point…hinges the entire political future of our people.”125 Clearly, the circumstances 
facing Germany in 1917 made the revisionists acutely aware of the precariousness of 
delaying reform. 
In addition to the necessity of ending the war as advantageously for Germany as 
possible, the revisionists also elaborated on the philosophical necessity of 
parliamentarianism. The revisionists’ insistence on reconnecting with German philosophy 
was driven by a perceived need to base its political movement on a fundamental truth. 
Sozialistische Monatshefte contributor Hermann Kranold’s proclaimed, “Neither 
enrichment of knowledge, nor transfiguration of being is now the task, but rather the 
application of knowledge to correcting mistakes.”126 Kranold’s demand that his fellow 
Germans apply their knowledge to advance to the third stage of development was a call 
for political action, but it contained philosophical assumptions regarding the nature of 
knowledge and the use of reason. The revisionists’ Parlamentarismus was the result of a 
philosophical inquiry into the nature of government, similar to the approaches of other 
influential political philosophers, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, or even the American revolutionaries. While revisionist support of 
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parliamentarianism might appear to have been purely practical, the majority of German 
socialists had only limited support for parliamentary government, with the most radical 
rejecting it outright. Like many other political theories, the revisionists sought to provide 
a much deeper support for their political ideology than pure practicality. 
Because of the revisionists’ philosophy, the necessity of parliamentarianism was a 
fundamental element of their conception of history. The Kantian-Marxian hybrid sought 
to define the relationship between necessity and possibility, the intersection of which 
reflects the revisionists’ perception of democracy. Peus observed, “It is clear that 
democracy is only a process of development that brings us ever closer to the ideal. 
Democracy is not brought about by any decree, but thereby the highest in its development 
is made possible.”127 True democracy was the result of a process, guided by the laws of 
development, which rendered it necessary. However, it was not a process that occurred 
without direct human action. Corresponding to the idea that parliamentarization of the 
Germany was necessary, revisionists also pointed out their unique opportunity to 
democratize the country. The opportunity presented itself in the days and weeks 
following the Revolution of November 9. Heine pointed out that the war “vanquished” 
the stigmatization of the left, if only temporarily.128 The threat of a counterrevolution 
made the process of democratization both necessary and pressing. Claiming that only a 
“rapid and thorough democratization” could stave off counterrevolution, Heine illustrates 
one of the great weaknesses of the German left during this revolutionary period. A 
perceived need to democratize Germany with all possible haste, coupled with a belief that 
the German people as a whole were uneducated in the democratic tradition, meant that 
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democratization along revisionist lines would be exceedingly difficult. In other words, 
the revisionists sought to do in a matter of months what had been accomplished over 
decades in France, England, and United States. But as Quessel admonished in 1917, 
“Germany, being subject to the laws of development, must ascend to the third stage of 
development or perish.”129 
 
Die Volksvertretung 
The revisionists believed Parlamentarismus was both a way of thinking about democracy 
and a necessary stage of development, but it is important to look more thoroughly at how 
they thought about the nature of the parliament itself. While there was some discussion 
within the pages of the Sozialistische Monatshefte about how the Reichstag should 
function, most of the discussion focused on the relationship between the Reichstag and 
the people. To the revisionists, democracy meant the “self administration, regulation, and 
execution of all collective matters of the people through the people themselves.”130 
Parliamentarianism was based on republicanism and one of its main justifications was its 
ability to channel the will of the people through a representative body of the people 
(Volksvertretung). As Peus explained, “The Volksvertretung must not regard itself only as 
a body of council but also must operate as body of will. The sovereignty of the people 
must find real expression through its representation.”131 The spirit of the people 
manifested through the Volksvertretung to form a more representative government than 
what existed under constitutionalism. 
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As republicans, the revisionists made a definite connection between Rousseau’s 
concept of the General Will and their own concept of the ‘people’s will,’ which they 
made all the more noticeable by specifically acknowledging Rousseau’s role in European 
political development. Unlike John Locke’s theory that the social contract ensured the 
protection of property, Rousseau argued that people submitted to the General Will both 
for protection and because it allowed them to remain free, insofar as no individual’s will 
could impose itself on another’s.132 However, like the much of the rest of the revisionists’ 
theory of democracy, the notion of the people’s will borrowed heavily from the German 
philosophical tradition by linking freedom and reason, in much the same way Kant linked 
them. The appeal to reason played a prominent role in the formation of the people’s will, 
which was then reflected in the Volksvertretung. 
Unlike Rousseau’s classically-influenced theory of sovereignty,133 by which the 
people legislate directly and thus was only suited to small states, the revisionists insisted 
that the size and complexity of the modern state necessitated a political body to represent 
the people’s will. Like its Rousseauean counterpart, the socialist people’s will was not the 
sum total of all individual wills, but rather a reflection of how the people cast their votes. 
Using the issue of voting rights as his foundation, Peus suggested a link between 
representative government, democracy, and the will of the people. At its core, he argued 
that the suffrage question in Germany at the end of the First World War was more than a 
matter removing legal impediments to democracy. Again building on the aforementioned 
account of the stages of development and the distinctions made between 
constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, Peus argued that it was not only necessary to 
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eliminate the Prussian three-tiered voting system, but like other aspects of 
democratization, insisted that the people themselves must become imbued with a 
democratic spirit. The “mere dispensing of ballots,” he insisted, was not the substance of 
democracy.134 If the casting of ballots was the sole criterion, his fellow revisionist Hugo 
Lindemann asked, “Have we not had a democratic franchise in the Reich for more than 
forty years?”135 The transition into the third and final stage of development was not to be 
a solely practical matter, but also a philosophical one. The right to vote and the right to 
cast equal votes were powerful manifestations of the people’s will. Without these two 
characteristics, there would be no people’s will and thus no democracy. However, the 
right to vote “must find its supplement in the determination of the parties of the people 
and the factions in the parliament.”136 
Like Locke and Rousseau, Peus argued that the will of the majority was the will 
of the people and was forced to accept democracy’s inherent flaws, which occur when the 
size of the minority approaches the size of the majority and the impact of the majority 
disproportionately outweighs that of the minority. “The goal can not be that a majority 
simply terrorizes a minority, but rather that the majority has the duty to conduct its 
policies in a manner that protects the common welfare.”137 Conversely, the majority 
could not completely acquiesce to the minority because a situation would then arise in 
which the minority would control the majority, negating the principle of democracy. 
While the use of reason and a democratic education would render this “as marginal and 
innocuous as possible,” according to Peus, parliamentarianism becomes necessary 
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because it provides the means to forming a will of the people through the formation of 
coalitions.138 If no people’s will can be formed, then each political party has a duty to 
cooperate with the other parties, using their will and their sense of responsibility to the 
whole people, to form a general will. This differed from the adversarial nature of party 
politics found in Britain, the United States, and even Wilhelmine Germany itself. “In the 
parliament, a party must do more than campaign for its fundamentals; there it has the 
important task: to form the people’s will.”139 Under these circumstances, the government 
could not ignore the parliament by claiming that no general will existed, as it had done 
during the Wilhemine era. 
According to Peus, “It does not yet suffice, however, that in the parliament a will 
is available that wants to govern and bear responsibility.”140 While Parliament could not 
to derive the will of the people on its own, the German people were “addicted to 
authority,” Peus argued, and they believed that to vote is merely to “elect [a] law 
giver.”141 While this was a step forward, he insisted that the people must learn to be 
genuinely responsible and to use the franchise to exercise that responsibility. As Quessel 
asserted, “Parliamentarianism means individual responsibility. And it is the fear of 
responsibility that allows the German left parties, which are accustomed to mere 
opposition, to consistently shy away from parliamentarization.”142 However, this 
individual responsibility was to transcend the immediate needs of the individual and be 
placed in the service of the whole through educating of the people, that is, through the use 
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of reason.143 The role of the SPD as an opposition party did not fit this idea of 
responsibility. As Kranold pointed out, for nearly a century the German left had had the 
opportunity to discuss and propose a set of democratic principles, but, with the exception 
of 1848, “carefully avoided participation in these debates.”144 While Peus pointed out that 
there were genuine opponents of democracy, primarily among the conservatives and 
liberals, the SPD still fluctuated “between the convenient position of criticism and 
opposition and the menace of full responsibility.”145 The revisionists saw the SPD as the 
bearers of genuine democracy, had to win over members of their own party. Poetzsch 
traced this tendency toward opposition back to the earliest formation of the SPD. In 1903, 
the party adopted a provision in the Dresden Resolution that forbade the party to seek 
power within the bourgeois society.146 While some members accepted the need to use the 
parliament for reform, Poetzsch asserted, “There is no denying that German social 
democracy never went beyond a Platonic love for the parliamentary government.”147 
If the SPD underestimated parliamentarianism, Heinrich Heine claimed it was 
because of the party’s longstanding belief in agitation and opposition, which it had to 
overcome for parliamentarianism to work. “One earns no new rights without taking on 
new duties…One cannot demand the rule of the people if one is not ready to grab 
sovereignty in the name of the people.”148 The Volksvertretung represented the 
channeling of reason into a people’s will. Beginning in 1917 and accelerating in 1918, 
Germany stood at the brink of a transformation into a new mode of government, but had 
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to take one final step by assuming responsibility. Upon taking that step, one of the last 
questions remaining was the administration of the state. 
 
Die Beamtenfrage 
As an advocate of a classical republicanism, Rousseau believed people should govern 
themselves directly and not through a representative body, according to revisionist 
politician Edmund Fischer.149 In contrast, the revisionists’ republicanism would use the 
Volksvertretung as a means of channeling the public’s will and transforming will into 
legislation. It was not to be an administrative body. A modern state with a population of 
80 million required a technically skilled and bureaucratically organized civil service, 
which Germany already possessed. Well before the outbreak of World War I, the German 
civil service epitomized the efficiency of bureaucratic administration. Despite its being 
ostensibly disinterested in political affairs, many on the left and center-left considered it a 
bulwark against democracy. The civil service was a form of institutionalized illiberalism. 
However, eliminating the civil service was neither desirable nor possible. Therefore, a 
discussion of the German civil service sheds light on one of the institutions accused of 
resisting the democratization of Germany and it was a central element of the revisionists’ 
conception of democracy.150 The revisionists faced the daunting task of reconciling the 
civil service with democratic parliamentarianism. Well aware of the need for a skilled 
civil service, revisionists believed key elements to successful parliamentarization were 
easing the eligibility requirements for entering the civil service and altering the way 
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people, including the civil servants themselves, thought about the relationship between 
the civil service and the people.  
As an institution that predated Germany unification and whose existence was one 
of the fundamental questions during the revolutionary period from 1918-1919, the civil 
service merits serious examination. Historians such as Eberhard Kolb and Hans 
Mommsen explain that one of Weimar’s perceived weaknesses was the left’s 
unwillingness to destroy Wilhelmine institutions, including the bureaucracy.151 How the 
revisionists addressed the Beamtenfrage, or the civil service question, reinforces the 
claim that Parlamentarismus referred to a broad concept of democratic ideology. 
Edmund Fischer admitted in 1919, “To the problems that are to be solved with the 
building of democracy in Germany, also belongs the Beamtenfrage.”152 As we have seen, 
one fundamental difference between constitutionalism and parliamentarianism was the 
bureaucracy’s dominance within the constitutionalist system and it was on that detail that 
the Revolution of November 9, according to one revisionist, struck the old system of the 
civil service “like lightning” and created an opportunity for social democracy to fill the 
civil service with a democratic spirit.153 
The history the civil service, in conjunction with how the revisionists thought 
about democracy in general, provides the foundation on which the revisionists offered 
their reform of the civil service. It also highlights two related aspects of history, one 
illustrating the effects of social and structural changes to Germany, the other illustrating 
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the impact of developing ideas. During the eighteenth century, political and military 
modernization brought with it an increased need for a bureaucratic administration to carry 
out the functions of the state.154 The highest-ranking civil servants firmly entrenched 
themselves in state life and their newly won prestige allowed them to position themselves 
closer to the aristocracy, even being awarded noble titles themselves.155 During the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic era, the role of the administrative officials increased 
as a result of the reorganization of the southern German states into the Confederation of 
the Rhine. During the Restoration that followed Napoleon Bonaparte’s defeat in 1815, the 
civil service became an inseparable part the state. James Sheehan calls this process “the 
consolidation of the Beamtenstaat,” which was as prevalent in the southern German 
states as it was in Prussia.156 Sheehan offers two examples that illustrate the justification 
behind the strength of the civil service and the extent to which the Germans granted it the 
power to administer the law. The Prussian politician and jurist Friedrich Karl von Beyme 
maintained that the civil service allowed Prussia to act in the spirit of representative 
government, rendering its actual absence unnoticeable. Similarly, Eduard Gans argued 
that the civil service and the subjects do not stand opposed to one another, but that the 
civil servant acts on behalf of the subject, representing him.157 By the middle of the 
nineteenth century, the Beamtenstaat, or civil service state, had essentially become a 
substitute for constitutional monarchy. 
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 Hegel was again an influential figure in German political development, this time 
in justifying the Beamtenstaat. Many scholars also rightly identify Hegel’s 1821 treatise 
The Philosophy of Right as an expression of Restoration political development, the 
influence of which extended well beyond Hegel’s death in 1831 and included thinkers 
who accepted neither his philosophical methods nor his overall philosophical project.158 
In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel traced political development as it progressed from its 
most basic structure, in the form of the family, to civil society and finally as it culminated 
in the form of the state. Phrasing his discussion of the state in terms of the subordination 
of civil society’s particular interests to the universal interests of the state, Hegel never 
departed from his dialectical method and absolute idealism. However, several of later 
sections contain arguments that support the Beamtenstaat independently of Hegel’s 
overall philosophy, specifically his discussion of the executive power and the role of the 
civil service. Hegel distinguished between the power of the prince to make decisions and 
the role of the executive branch, which in this case was the civil service, to carry out 
those decisions. Even though Hegel cast his conception of the state as the actualized Idea 
and the intersection of the particular and the universal, the role of the civil service was 
“the particularization of the universal will.”159 By this he meant that the officials’ roles 
transcended the particular interests of civil (i.e. bourgeois) society and subordinated them 
to the universal interests of the state. The civil service therefore was tasked with applying 
universal principles to particular or individual cases. However, administrative tasks were 
subject to the power of the prince, who was the “pinnacle and starting point of the 
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whole,” and not to the people themselves.160 Despite Hegel’s absolute idealism, the 
general functioning of the state and the bureaucracy in the late nineteenth century largely 
matched his outline, which was then reflected in the revisionists’ critique of the 
administration of the state. 
Even if Hegel’s claims of the particularization of the universal had created a 
rational and just civil service, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck ensured that the 
civil service would not remain genuinely apolitical. Following unification in 1871, 
Bismarck strengthened the position of the civil service as an instrument of illiberalism 
and the Prussian model of civil service became the Imperial model. In the 1880s, 
Bismarck’s Interior Minister, Robert von Puttkamer, took over the task of ensuring the 
conservative character of the civil service.161 While Bismarck made some reforms easing 
the entry requirements, the government still drew its civil servants from a pool of 
applicants who had studied jurisprudence, practiced law, and passed the entrance exams. 
Suggestions that would have made it easier for workers to achieve the requirements 
needed to become civil servants met with stiff resistance.162 Most importantly, the 
government retained the right to refuse admittance to the civil service for political 
reasons and to force those of liberal persuasions into early retirement and although there 
were no laws barring civil servants from serving in the Reichstag, they were strongly 
discouraged from serving, creating the illusion of being apolitical. As the history of the 
German civil service, indicates, it was not an apolitical institution. Rather, the policies 
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put in place during the Wilhelmine period ensured that it was “politically homogenous” 
along conservative lines.163 
The existence of a civil service was necessary for the modern state to function, 
but was not without complications. The revisionists praised the civil service for its 
expertise and for its dutiful and effective administration of the state. The problem lay 
with the political leanings of its members, the conservative nature of which presented an 
obstacle to democracy. Revisionist Georg Flatow called attention to this dichotomy, 
describing the civil service as “very dutiful and, in non-political affairs, objective, well 
skilled, and incorruptible… but anti-democratic, anti-socialist, and strongly 
monarchical.”164 Since the German government, which was still dominated by the 
conservatives, determined the composition of the civil service, which reinforced its anti-
democratic tendencies, the social democrats’ task was not only to alter the composition of 
the civil service, but also to alter how its members thought about their relationship to 
democracy, the state, and the people. “The most beautiful constitution and administrative 
laws are of no use if the spirit of the old remains,” remarked Flatow.165 
There was no widespread call for replacing the civil servants themselves, as that 
would have been contrary to the insistence that any transition be as smooth as necessary. 
Edmund Fischer acknowledged the exigency of reconciling an anti-democratic but 
proficient civil service with the revisionists’ call for democratic reform. “With the 
democratic rebuilding (Neubau) in Germany,” Fischer asserted, “one may not copy cut-
and-dried examples of the past or of other countries, but at this juncture, must make use 
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of the traditional, which has proven itself as good and practical.”166 Fischer argued that 
the ‘traditional path’ of Western political development, which spanned from Athens to 
medieval England and culminated with the founding of the United States, was neither 
feasible nor desirable for Germany. That traditional path was the path of bourgeois 
democracy and constitutionalism.167 Therefore, neither Montesquieu’s nor Rousseau’s 
theories of self-administration stood up to the demands of modern society and Fischer 
even claimed that Rousseau’s theory of democracy was little more than the refining of a 
practice that dated back to antiquity and lasted through the medieval period.168 Fischer 
used these examples to argue that Germany required its own system of state 
administration by a technically adept, bureaucratic civil service imbued with a democratic 
spirit. In short, he suggested that Germany already possessed that form of administration; 
all that was required was its democratization. 
Emphasizing the utility of traditional institutions, as Fischer did, is often a 
characteristic of conservative thought, but the revisionists were still socialists. It is how 
they determined what was ‘good and practical’ that set them apart, as the previous 
chapter illustrates. A civil service was as important to the revisionists as it was to the 
liberals and conservatives, all of whom recognized the efficacy of such an administrative 
body. How well the civil service carried out its official tasks was never the problem. The 
problem was how the civil service fit into the conception of a parliamentary state. 
Government and administration were two separate spheres, in many ways operating 
independently of one another, yet they were linked by their connection to the people. 
Fischer acknowledged that democracy and bureaucracy were often irreconcilable because 
                                                 
     
166
 Fischer, “Das Beamtentum der Zukunft,” 389. 
     
167
 Ibid, 391-392. 
     
168
 Ibid, 389-390. 
 75 
of the latter’s tendency to remove the people from direct administration of the state. 
Nevertheless, he called the reconciliation of the two institutions “the great task of the 
next epoch.”169 
 Ludwig Quessel also advocated the separation of powers between government 
and the administration. “In the Obrigkeitsystem,” he insisted, “it is the bureaucracy in 
which the legislative and the executive power merge.”170 Because he believed 
bureaucracy in a constitutionalist state was responsible to neither the parliament nor the 
people, Quessel echoed B.G. Niebuhr’s century-old claim that the administration of the 
state was more important than its constitution.171 However, Quessel agreed that that was 
true only under constitutionalism, the stage of development in which the monarch shares 
power with the parliament and the civil service. Quessel argued that in reality, parliament 
was unable to hold the civil service in check, resulting in “the absolute rule of the 
bureaucracy.”172 The great advantage of Parlamentarismus was it that would eliminate 
the tension between governance and administration, replacing any motivations for self-
interest with the desire to work for the people. The civil service would take care of the 
administration of the state, while the parliament and the government would legislate and 
execute laws. The revisionists did not want the two to overlap in their respective duties. 
They wanted each side to have clearly defined roles, but they also did not want them to 
be antagonistic in an attempt to avoid a situation in which the either parliament or the 
administration sought to undermine the other’s work, which is what Bismarck and 
Puttkamer intended. 
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To achieve the necessary reconciliation, the revisionists proposed that the civil 
service be democratized and politically educated on the benefits of democracy. It was 
nonsense, they insisted, to advocate for a politically disinterested bureaucracy. 
Lindemann reminded his readers that the common justification for a disinterested civil 
service was that it formed a counterbalance to the ‘special interests’ of the political 
parties.173 Since political parties were vital to the parliamentary system, serving the 
people rather than special interests, the old argument no longer was no longer relevant. 
Similarly, Georg Flatow accused the bourgeoisie of having fought with the “feudal 
classes” for the right to be incorporated into the civil service, but only to further their 
own interests. Using the civil service as a means to persevering class interests ran counter 
to its democratization.174 
Some revisionists believed that the officials should be allowed to openly advocate 
political opinions. Peus, for example, insisted that the “political incapacity” of the civil 
service was detrimental to the state. Its members needed to be free to think and do as they 
felt they must, relying on the same deontological ethics as any other member of society. 
“The constriction of political freedom of the civil servants is firstly an atrophy of the 
rights of the civil servants as citizens.”175 Not only was a civil service was necessary for 
the form of parliamentarianism demanded by the revisionists, but a politicized civil 
service. Peus argued that the conflict between the people’s representatives in the 
legislature and the political independence of the civil service could be remedied if the 
civil service and combines its expertise with the will of the people’s representatives. 
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Politicizing the civil service was “a question of political education of people.”176 In short, 
the civil service should think no differently than any other citizen because the categorical 
imperative impelled them just the same. 
The revisionists sought to overcome the Wilhelmine government’s interference in 
the composition of the civil service, believing there should be few obstacles to becoming 
a civil servant. Fischer argued that the educational requirements alone are unable to 
guarantee a competent official. Except where common sense dictated otherwise, as with 
those in the medical field, he argued that educational requirements for the officialdom 
were inconsistent with democracy, particularly when there were no such limitations for 
ministerial positions.177 Flatow not only demanded that the civil service be open to all 
qualified persons, he demanded that everyone must be able to achieve the necessary 
qualifications, insisting, “Access to the higher offices may henceforth remain closed to no 
competent person on material bases.”178 
The civil service was an indispensable part of modern democracy and like 
suffrage and the parliament, its existence alone did not guarantee democracy. The 
revisionists hoped that ‘knowledge sharpened by experience’ would reveal the path by 
which Germany would achieve democratization. “The barriers of democracy will have to 
fall, which were erected within the civil service between… the officials and the 
people.”179 To achieve a functioning parliamentary democracy, the civil service would 
have to be instilled with the same democratic spirit as the people, the parties, and the 
parliament. The only way to achieve this kind of uniformly democratic thought was apply 
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the Categorical Imperative, with the understanding that economic existence determined 
the foundations of thought. 
The civil service best represents the intersection of ideas and action as proposed 
by revisionism. The civil servant, according to Mannheim, had a “socially limited 
horizon” that prevented him from recognizing that behind every law was “the 
Weltanschauung of a specific social group.”180 Revisionism not only sought to overcome 
the civil servant’s failure to recognize the origin of the law which he administers, but also 
to replace the particular social interests that lay behind the law with the universal and 
ethical worldview that was inherent in the revisionist theory of democracy. The civil 
service, like suffrage and Volksvertretung, represents a specific application of idea to 
practice, thereby illustrating the link between the purely philosophical foundations of 
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Conclusion 
German revisionists dedicated themselves to working out a democratic ideology based on 
what they believed were a set of fundamental truths arising from the reconciliation of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism and Marx’s historical materialism. Similar to methods that 
liberal philosophers used in the eighteenth century to assert the existence of the 
individual’s natural and inalienable rights and to advocate representative government, 
revisionists legitimized their Parlamentarismus on the basis of the knowledge derived 
from the material world and the socially just action generated from that knowledge. 
Kant’s philosophy provided a link between knowledge and freedom, which cast Marx’s 
economic determinism as a liberating and efficacious force. Although neither Kant nor 
Marx proposed any specific course of action, the revisionists’ reconciliation of their ideas 
provided a guideline for discovering the underlying principles of social relations and 
acting rationally based on that understanding.  
Revisionism was unique from mainstream socialism. The common interpretation 
of Marxism taught that changes in the state apparatus reflect a change in the 
consciousness of the proletariat and the awareness of the true nature of reality would 
manifest in an overthrow of the bourgeois, industrial society and the erecting of a 
socialist state, and finally the dissolution of the state altogether. The revisionists rejected 
the dialectical element of Marxism, and thus had no need for revolution. However, they 
still believed that political change occurred through a transformation of consciousness. 
Declaring that all people possessed the same framework of knowledge and the same 
capacity for reason, both of which were shaped by economic reality, the revisionists 
reconciled Kant and Marx. Parlamentarismus was their attempt to continue building on 
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the philosophical foundations of the Enlightenment and to apply them to the political 
sphere. 
There was certainly a substantial amount of continuity between Imperial Germany 
and the Weimar Republic. The old elites never completely lost their status and existing 
institutions like the civil service remained largely intact. Revisionists proposed few 
changes to the structure of German government, which is an indication that they viewed 
democratization primarily as a mode of thought that leads to democratic action, rather 
than the existence of a parliament or the act of voting. In philosophical terms, they 
recognized that the formal elements of democracy already existed, but that they lacked 
democratic content. Unlike their mainstream Marxist counterparts within the SPD, the 
revisionists believed that working within the state to develop and nurture democratic 
thought among the people, as well as within the government and the bureaucracy, was the 
means to achieving democratic reform. Rather than stifle politics or push them into the 
background, the revisionists encouraged political discourse. If the German people were 
encouraged to think about politics, that is, to make use of their reason to determine 
political action, then they would logically favor social democracy. 
It is no coincidence that the revisionists offered a fairly complete outline for 
Parlamentarismus during World War I because the war was a climacteric for Germany. 
According to the revisionists, the war highlighted the failures of the constitutionalist 
system. Not only was it responsible for involving Germany in the war, but it also failed to 
successfully execute the war. As a result, Germany stood on the brink of defeat militarily 
and it stood on the brink of collapse domestically. By 1918, it was clear that Germany 
could not achieve a victor’s peace and was unlikely to avoid a defeat, but transitioning 
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into the third stage of development was still possible and absolutely necessary. While 
Quessel’s stages of development illustrated a general trend, the revisionists’ vision of 
Parlamentarismus justified the use of existing institutions and ideas and was therefore 
unique. Consequently, any supposedly ‘traditional path’ of Western political 
development would not have been suitable for Germany. The revisionists’ return to Kant, 
which complimented Marxism, reveals the connection between the Enlightenment and 
twentieth-century social democracy. Significantly, this German form of democracy was 
the product of the left, rather than the bourgeoisie, which has most often been identified 
as the bearer of democracy. 
Despite their committed effort to the development of Parlamentarismus in 
Germany, the circumstances immediately following the end of the war prevented the 
successful implementation of Parlamentarismus. Even though the constitution of 1919 
addressed many of the problems associated with Imperial Germany and democracy 
gradually achieved a level of acceptance by the middle class during the Weimar years, 
German democracy faced other hurdles. Compounding the economic and foreign policy 
problems resulting from the war, the rationally-minded revisionists were forced to 
confront the rise of anti-rational ideologies, especially from the right. The end of the war 
reflected a sharp break from many of the worldviews held prior to the outbreak of war in 
1914. While the Weimar Republic superficially fit many elements of revisionism, the 
severity of economic collapse, coupled with the widespread and unprecedented 
resentment over the resolution of the war precluded any chance for the revisionists’ 
rational republic from becoming reality. With such a comprehensive democratic 
ideology, it is difficult to argue that German socialism failed in 1918 and 1919. The lack 
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of revolutionary change makes sense from the revisionists’ perspective. Even if these 
revisionists remained a minority, the weakening of the ideology outlined in the Erfurt 
Program of 1890 indicates some level of revisionism within mainstream German 
socialism after November 9, 1918. There, we must also look elsewhere to find the causes 
of Weimar’s collapse, particularly at the radical right-wing ideologies that also emerged 
after November 9. It seems plausible, after taking into account the existence of 
democratic ideology of the left, to argue that the collapse of the Weimar Republic was 
not a failure of German Social Democracy, per se. Rather, it was the overwhelming 
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